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TRADE MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. 




The General Agreement [on Tariffs and Trade] has been in effect 
for a period of over 10 years, including such crises as the Berlin 
airlift, the Korean War, and the Closing of the Suez Canal, but 
there has never been an invocation of this exception based on the 
existence of an emergency in international relations.1
[I]f the WTO were to undertake to review an invocation of Article 
XXI, this would undermine the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system and even the viability of the WTO as a whole.2
In a time of complex economic interdependence and rapid technological 
innovation, the global trading system is confronted by the entanglement of 
“trade multilateralism”3 and “national security.”45 Most problematic from a 
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1. Walter Hollis, Confidential Memorandum, International Legal Problems Involved 
in Certain Proposed Modifications of Voluntary Petroleum Restrictions, U.S. Dep’t of State 
(Nov. 3, 1958) (on file with General Records of the Dep’t of State, National Archives at Col-
lege Park, MD (“NACP”), record group 59, box 11, A1-5393, file ‘National Security 
Amendment’).
2. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Union, United States—
Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminium Products, 34, WTO Doc. WT/DS548/14 (Oct. 29 
2018).
3. The term “trade multilateralism” refers to coordinated procedures and substantive 
principles in trade, such as liberalization and non-discrimination. It draws from John Ruggie’s
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legal perspective is how to address the concept of national security within 
the institutional structure of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).
World trade law enables governments to address exigent security cir-
cumstances and temporarily suspend or deviate from their international 
trade commitments.6 Yet, at the same time that trade disputes are escalating, 
there is fear that the WTO cannot serve as an outlet for dealing with dis-
putes involving national security.7
Members implementing security measures suggest that they have sole 
authority to determine when to take “any action which [they] consider[] 
necessary for the protection of [their] essential security interests,” under Ar-
ticle XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the “GATT”), 
entitled “Security Exceptions.”8 However, interpreting the language this 
definition of multilateralism: “Multilateralism is an institutional form that coordinates rela-
tions among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct: that is, 
principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the par-
ticularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific oc-
currence.” John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, in
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 3, 11 
(John G. Ruggie ed., 1993); see also James N. Miller, Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 
1939–1945: The Impact of Anglo-American Trade Policy Negotiations 3, 9–10 (Aug. 1, 2003) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, Emmanuel College) (on file with author) 
(describing several “incentives to cooperate”); RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR 
DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE 13 (3rd ed. 1980); c.f. Harlan G. Cohen, Multilateral-
ism Life Cycle, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 50 (2018) (offering another perspective on trade mul-
tilateralism: “a preference— a belief that, all things being equal, broader more inclusive re-
gimes would best solve the problems at hand, whether functionally or normatively.”).
4. This article focuses on the traditional definition of “national security,” which pri-
marily refers to a state’s “defensive posture and self-protecting response” to external threats. 
ROBERT JACKSON, THE GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES 186 
(2003); see also Panel Report, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 7.130, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R (adopted April 26, 2019) [hereinafter Panel Report, Russia—Traffic 
in Transit] (providing the WTO’s definition of “essential security interests”—those interests 
“relating to the quintessential functions of the state, namely, the protection of its territory and 
its population from external threats, and the maintenance of law and public order internally.”).
5. See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Interdependence Approach: The-
oretical Development and Empirical Demonstration, 23 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 713, 714 
(2016); Anthea Roberts et al., Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and In-
vestment (Sept. 16, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389163.
6. Caroline Henckels, Investment Treaty Security Exceptions, Necessity and Self-
Defence in the Context of Armed Conflict, in International Investment Law and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, EURO. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 319, 328 (K. Fach Gómez et al. eds., 2019) (ob-
serving that the security exceptions are an “affirmative defense”). For an assessment of which 
treaties provide states with the opportunity to invoke national security considerations, see
Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What 
Role for the WTO, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 366–70 (2003).
7. WORLD TRADE ORG., Panels Established to Review India, Swiss Complaints 
Against US Tariffs (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/
dsb_04dec18_e.htm.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; see Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
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way removes the WTO’s oversight over the invocation of these security ex-
ceptions and risks a “loophole” for governments to act opportunistically and 
without legal consequence under international law.9 It further unhinges the 
multilateral rules, norms, and dispute settlement procedures that create the 
framework through which governments can ward off narrow sectoral pres-
sures on trade policy-making, focus on rules and renegotiate them, and 
“thrash out their differences on trade issues.”10
For decades, article XXI GATT was rarely invoked;11 it lay like a 
dormant dragon beneath the mountain, still dangerous but fallen out of 
memory.12 Until now. Today, there are an unprecedented number of disputes 
at the WTO involving national security. After Russia blocked Ukrainian ex-
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 187 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
Article XXI of the GATT provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed 
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests;
(b) to prevent any contacting party from taking any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests;
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are de-
rived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to 
such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 
9. See, e.g., Simon Lester & Huan Zhu, Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse 
of the National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade, CATO INST., Policy Analysis No. 
874 (June 25, 2019), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/closing-pandoras-box-
growing-abuse-national-security-rationale.
10. WORLD TRADE ORG., 10 Things the WTO Can Do, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/10thi_e/10thi00_e.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2019); Frieder Roessler, De-
mocracy, Redistribution and the WTO: A Comment on Quinn Slobodian’s Book Globalists: 
The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 353 (2019) (book 
review).
11. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.81 (“Members have 
generally exercised restraint in their invocations of Article XXI(b)(iii).”); see also Roger P. 
Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 697 (2011).
12. The reference to the dragon is a nod to J.R.R. Tolkien’s Middle-earth legend of 
Smaug, the Dragon of Erebor. See J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBIT OR THERE AND BACK AGAIN 
(1937).
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ports to key markets in Central Asia and the Caucasus through road and rail 
transport restrictions, Ukraine launched WTO proceedings, and Russia de-
fended its actions under article XXI. This resulted in the first formal WTO 
panel report on the interpretation of article XXI, Russia—Measures Con-
cerning Traffic in Transit (Russia—Traffic in Transit), in 2019.13
Aside from the international crisis involving Russia and Ukraine, there 
are other conflicts currently involving national security at the WTO. At the 
time of this writing, Japan has restricted the export of certain chemicals cru-
cial to South Korea’s electronics industry, citing national security risks.14
India has announced it will withdraw trade preferences to Pakistan due to 
national security reasons.15 Qatar has launched several WTO proceedings 
against Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates due to alleged 
violations of international trade rules.16 Qatar’s conflicts stem from 2017 
when it was subjected to an economic embargo by Saudi Arabia and its Gulf 
Cooperation Council partners due to allegations that the Qatari government 
funded terrorism.17 Recent tensions over global control of fifth generation 
cellular technology by Chinese firm Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. have 
led several states to take action on the grounds of national security, raising 
speculation of future WTO disputes in response.18 Separately, seven WTO 
13. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4.
14. See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, Japan and South Korea Are Being Pulled 
into a Low Level Economic War, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2019); see also Lindsay Maizland, 
The Japan-South Korea Trade Dispute: What to Know, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 5, 
2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/japan-south-korea-trade-dispute-what-know (outlining the 
historical grievances and regional policy tensions between the two states).
15. Bryce Baschuk, India Withdraws Trade Preferences to Pakistan; Cites WTO 
Clause, BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 15, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/international-
trade/india-withdraws-trade-preferences-to-pakistan-cites-wto-clause.
16. See WORLD TRADE ORG., DS526: United Arab Emirates—Measures Relating to 
Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(2017), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/archive_e/dscases_arc_e.htm?dscase=526 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2019); see Request for Consultations by Qatar, United Arab Emirates—
Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS526/1 (Feb. 28, 2018); Request for Consultations by Qa-
tar, Bahrain—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS527/1 (July 31, 2017); Request for Consul-
tations by Qatar, Saudi Arabia—Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, and 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS528/1 (July 31, 
2017).
17. Bryce Baschuk, WTO to Probe Qatar’s TV Piracy Claim Against Saudi Arabia,
BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/
wto-to-investigate-qatar-s-tv-piracy-claim-against-saudi-arabia.
18. See Adam Satariano et al., U.S. Tech Suppliers, Including Google, Restrict Deal-
ings with Huawei After Trump Order, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/05/20/technology/google-android-huawei.html; see Cassell Bryan-Low & Colin Pack-
ham, How Australia Led the US in Its Global War Against Huawei, THE SYDNEY MORNING 
HERALD (May 22, 2019), https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/how-australia-led-the-us-in-its-
global-war-against-huawei-20190522-p51pv8.html. 
Spring 2020] Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security 113
Members have challenged the legality of extra-schedule tariffs imposed by 
the United States19 on imports of steel and aluminum deemed to threaten 
U.S. national security,20 pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962.21
The historicization of article XXI GATT was crucial to the Russia—
Traffic in Transit panel’s interpretation of the article.22 The report delivers a 
powerful signal to WTO Members relying on national security claims: De-
spite the political facets of the Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute, the panel 
concluded that the dispute involved a legal question that was suitable for le-
gal assessment.23 Moreover, the panel found that the Member invoking arti-
cle XXI does not have the sole authority to interpret the security exception 
provision—that article XXI is not purely “self-judging.”24 Against the text of 
article XXI and the “general object and purpose” of the WTO agreements, 
the panel found that the existence of the circumstances enumerated in the 
subparagraphs of article XXI(b) was subject to objective determination.25 In 
doing so, the panel found that while the invoking Member has discretion to 
decide on the necessity of measures, the circumstances when it can do so are 
eminently justiciable.26 Still, the Russia—Traffic in Transit panel report is 
not the final word on the matter.27 The dramatic rise in trade disputes in-
19. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., Panels Established to Review US Steel and Alumin-
ium Tariffs, Countermeasures on US Imports (Nov. 21, 2018) https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news18_e/dsb_19nov18_e.htm. At the time of publication, the first U.S. submission 
in United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products was posted publicly. 
OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum (June 12, 
2019), https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/enforcement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/wto-dispute-
settlement/pending-wto-dispute-50.
20. The GATT actually allows some tariffs; WTO Members negotiate over the maxi-
mum or “ceiling” tariff rates that they will offer each other on various kinds of goods. As long 
as members set their tariffs below these “bound” rates, the imposition of a tariff alone is not a 
violation of the GATT.  See PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS 87–88 (2d ed. 2012).
21. See Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, §232, 76 Stat. 877 (1962).
22. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.83 (noting that “[the 
panel’s] textual and contextual interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii), in the light of the object 
and purpose of the GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement, is confirmed by the negotiating history 
of Article XXI of the GATT 1947.”). See also Jean d’Aspremont, Critical Histories of Inter-
national Law and the Repression of Disciplinary Imagination, 7 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 89 
(2019) (defining historicization as when international lawyers engage “in the creation of dis-
courses about the past to give the latter a form and a meaning intelligible in the present”).
23. See Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.103, n.183. See also 
infra Part VIII. For this first formal reading of article XXI, the panel was led by well-known 
international lawyer and former Appellate Body member Georges Abi Saab.
24. Id. ¶¶ 7.102–7.103. But see Third-Party Oral Statement by the United States, Rus-
sia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶ 35, WTO Doc. WT/DS512 (Jan. 25, 2018). 
25. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7.66, 7.69–7.77.
26. See Id. ¶¶ 7.100–7.103 (adding “there is no basis for treating the invocation of Arti-
cle XXI(b)(iii) . . . as an incantation that shields a challenged measure from all scrutiny”).
27. Even if adopted, panel reports are not binding precedent for other disputes, even on 
the same questions of WTO law. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-
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volving national security has resuscitated debate over the degree of discre-
tion afforded to WTO Members as to when and how a Member may invoke 
the security exceptions with binding effect.28
The language of article XXI does not precisely define what elements of 
the article are self-judging. Nor does it confirm how WTO adjudicative bod-
ies may review trade disputes involving highly sensitive security concerns. 
Article XXI begins, “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed,” and 
article XXI(b)’s chapeau continues, “to prevent any Member from taking 
any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential se-
curity interests,” in relation to certain enumerated circumstances (e.g., those 
actions relating to fissionable materials; those relating to the traffic in arms, 
ammunition, and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; or those 
taken in time of war or other “emergency in international relations”).
Some scholars maintain that the adjectival clause “which it considers” 
renders the security exceptions wholly self-judging.29 Emphasis is placed on 
the words “it” and “considers” as allocating total (or very high) discretion to 
the state in determining both what constitutes its essential security interests 
and the means it “considers” necessary to protect those essential security 
interests.30 This implies that no other Member or WTO body has “any right 
to determine whether a measure taken by a sanctioning member satisfies the 
requirements” of article XXI.31 With total, unfettered discretion, a WTO 
Member could make a direct jurisdictional defense that a WTO adjudicative 
body lacks jurisdiction to review an invocation of article XXI, as Russia ar-
gued in the Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute.32
WTO Members may also argue that the dispute is nonjusticiable be-
cause WTO adjudicating bodies must defer total interpretation of article 
XXI to the discretion of the invoking WTO Member, as the U.S. had argued 
Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 158, 160–162, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/
AB/R (adopted May 20, 2008) (elaborating on the value in following WTO panel and Appel-
late Body reports, despite the absence of formal binding precedent). See also Joost Pauwelyn, 
Minority Rules: Precedent and Participation Before the WTO Appellate Body, in
ESTABLISHING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 141, 141–172 (Jo-
anna Jemielniak et al. eds., 2016) (evaluating the importance of precedent in the WTO).
28. See Akande & Williams, supra note 6, at 384, n.81 (observing the issue is “whether 
there is a right of unilateral determination of the obligation by one party which the other party 
is bound to accept”).
29. See Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT 
Says and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 268–69 (1998); see 
also V.A. SEYID MUHAMMAD, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF WORLD TRADE 176–78 (1958).
30. See Holger P. Hestermeyer, Article XXI Security Exceptions; Peter-Tobias Stoll, 
Article XXIII Nullification or Impairment, in WTO—TRADE IN GOODS 578–79 (Rüdiger 
Wolfrum et al. eds., 2010).
31. Bhala, supra note 29, at 269.
32. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.103; see Hannes L. 
Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: 
National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 438 (1999).
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in its Third Party submissions in the Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute.33
Justiciability relates to the “nature” of the dispute, and requires considera-
tion of whether or not the dispute is “capable of being disposed of judicial-
ly.”34
The challenge with either claim is that under either approach the WTO 
lacks recourse to regulate the invocation of a security exception; the invok-
ing Member would solely determine the political and economic costs for 
deviating from their trade commitments.35 The danger of this is the potential 
for a cascade of unilateral “self-help” actions.36
Some commentators have sought nuance within the self-judging nature 
of the chapeau in an effort to allow competent dispute settlement bodies to 
control for abuse.37 For example, there remains diverse commentary as to 
whether the adjectival clause “which it considers” refers to the determina-
tion of the “necessity” of the measures taken, or whether it qualifies only the 
determination of a Member’s “essential security interests.”38 Another obser-
vation is that WTO adjudicative bodies can control opportunistic use of the 
exceptions by incorporating an obligation of good faith into the interpreta-
tion of article XXI.39  Such an obligation would set limits to several seem-
ingly open-ended terms included in article XXI, particularly “security inter-
33. Responses of the United States to Questions from the Panel and Russia to Third 
Parties, Russia—Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, ¶¶ 18–19, WTO Doc. WT/DS512
(Feb. 20, 2019); see Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.103. The 
WTO adjudicating bodies referred to here are the Dispute Settlement Body panels, the Appel-
late Body (a permanent body of seven members entrusted to review the legal aspects of the 
reports issued by panels), and article 25 arbitrators. See Dispute Settlement Rules: Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 
33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
34. Responses of the United States to Questions from the Panel and Russia to Third 
Parties, supra note 33, ¶¶ 18–19.
35. See Alan O. Sykes, Economic “Necessity” in International Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 296, 303 (2015); Benton J. Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic 
Order, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3361107. 
36. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 282 (2013).
37. See Heath, supra note 35, at 45; see, e.g., Akande & Williams, supra note 6, at 
386–402 (drawing attention to the nature of the term “considers” in the chapeau and evaluat-
ing a good faith review of the security exceptions).
38. Compare Schloemann & Ohloff, supra note 32, at 450, with Akande & Williams, 
supra note 6 at 386, 397, 399, Alford, supra note 11, at 704, and Michael J. Hahn, Vital Inter-
ests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
558, 589–90 (1991). For a comparison of state practice, see Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in 
Transit, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7.62–7.101, ¶ 7.36 (main arguments of Australia), ¶ 7.43 (the Euro-
pean Union), ¶ 7.37 (Brazil).
39. See Akande & Williams, supra note 6, at 390–96; see Schloemann & Ohlhoff, su-
pra note 32, at 444; Alford, supra note 11, at 708.
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ests” and “emergency in international relations.”40 Despite the open-ended 
nature of the article, commentators have tethered the language to “bona 
fide” military and defense paradigms, further noting that “Article XXI does 
not encompass exigencies such as a member government’s financial distress 
or domestic economic crises that are unrelated to war and international 
emergencies.”41
As this article shows, detailed archival investigation into U.S. practice 
during the construction of the security exceptions within the framework of 
the International Trade Organization (“ITO”) Charter42—the original multi-
lateral trade bargain—complicates current debates about the plausible legal 
interpretive steps involved in invoking article XXI GATT. The United 
States was the main architect in the design and placement of the security ex-
ceptions within the ITO. Due to the overwhelming influence the United 
States had in designing and constructing the exceptions, U.S. practice offers 
a revealing lens by which to study the history of article XXI.43 Moreover, in 
the Russia—Traffic in Transit decision, the U.S. observed that “the U.S. un-
derstanding of the security exemption in article XXI has been consistent” 
with the article’s negotiating history, the statements of the GATT contract-
ing parties, and the statements of other WTO Members, that article XXI is 
totally self-judging.44
This article argues that analyzing internal U.S. practice during the mak-
ing of article XXI is relevant for current and future efforts to interpret the 
exceptions, thereby contributing to existing literature on article XXI GATT. 
Moreover, to the extent that article XXI is meant to clarify the bounds be-
tween trade multilateralism and national security, this article explores the 
multifaceted considerations that shaped U.S. national security policy and 
foreign economic policy at the time article XXI was drafted, which, in turn, 
created the language, phrasing, and placement of the security exceptions in 
the ITO Charter.
Out of the complex debate among U.S. officials during the construction 
of the security exceptions, this article reveals several legal choices made by 
U.S. officials that are relevant to understanding the construction of article 
XXI GATT. First, it reveals the competing perspectives of U.S. agencies as 
to how to balance U.S. national security against the creation of an interde-
40. Heath, supra note 35, at 48–49.
41. Sykes, supra note 35, at 303 (emphasis in original); see also Hahn, supra note 38,
at 580; Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.130.
42. The negotiation of the International Trade Organization [“ITO”] Charter began in 
1946 and concluded in March 1948 in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employ-
ment held in Havana. Meanwhile, negotiation of the GATT occurred in Geneva in 1947, dur-
ing the second preparatory meeting of delegates for ITO Charter negotiations. See infra Part II
for background on the ITO.
43. To understand how the ITO Charter is relevant to the interpretation of the GATT, 
see JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 46–49 (1969).
44. See Third-Party Oral Statement by the United States, Russia—Measures Concern-
ing Traffic in Transit, supra note 24, ¶ 33.
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pendent global economy and a multilateral trade institution meant to aid 
governments in resolving trade disputes peacefully. It is important to note 
that the U.S. debate over the exceptions occurred against a backdrop of the 
“birth” of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.45 Economic 
issues were inlayed into U.S. foreign policy, and internal conflicts devel-
oped as competing agencies prescribed different approaches to the post-war 
international economy. Internal U.S. debates reveal that challenges to con-
structing the security exceptions ran deeper than an exercise in linguistics. 
There were fundamental disagreements about U.S. engagement with the 
multilateral trade system, as it remained unclear whether the ITO (and then 
the GATT) would benefit or hinder U.S. security interests at home and 
abroad.
Officials at the U.S. Department of State (the “DOS” or “State”) who 
advocated for the U.S. to take leadership in the construction of the post-
World War II international economic order saw the exceptions differently 
than officials from the Army, Navy, and War Departments (“Services” or 
“Services Departments”), who were charged with post-war U.S. military 
and defense planning. This article captures the policy considerations that 
emerged during these internal debates to explain how and why the U.S. ne-
gotiators compromised on the language of the ITO Charter’s security excep-
tions, which together ultimately constituted article XXI GATT. While DOS 
and Services both sought to prioritize U.S. national security in drafting the 
security exceptions, this article reveals that DOS officials were consistently 
concerned with the use and abuse of these exceptions by other ITO Mem-
bers and with the exceptions’ effects on the broader ITO project. By con-
trast, Services officials prioritized states’ total power of unilateral interpreta-
tion that would confirm maximum U.S. powers, regardless of the impact on 
the broader multilateral trade project.
Second, exploring the internal U.S. materials adds plausibility to the no-
tion that the U.S. negotiators did not believe the security exceptions were 
purely self-judging in nature and non-justiciable. Internal U.S. debates show 
how divided the U.S. negotiators were about purely self-judging security 
exceptions. Moreover, this article details how DOS officials considered the 
construction of the exceptions while they contemporaneously considered the 
functioning of the nullification or impairment procedure, the legal basis of 
dispute settlement.46 The history of internal U.S. debates also highlights 
stances not taken by the United States in the delegates’ meetings, such as a 
firm position that a Member with security concerns shall have sole, open-
ended authority to determine when to suspend or extinguish its commitment 
to the international trade legal framework.
45. BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR 135–36 (2018) 
(placing the “birth” of the Cold War as July 7, 1947—right in the middle of when the United 
States was constructing the security exceptions).
46. See generally Stoll, supra note 30, at 598–615.
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Evidence that the U.S. negotiators did not plan for purely self-judging 
security exceptions is further revealed in the materials they prepared for the 
U.S. Congress after the conclusion of the ITO Charter in 1948. U.S. nego-
tiators outlined the legal steps required to interpret the security exceptions. 
They presented a two-step approach. First, an invoking ITO member would 
determine both its “essential security interests” and the “necessity” of its 
measure for the protection of its essential security interests.47 Second, the 
ITO bodies would answer the factual question of whether the invoking ITO 
Member’s security-related actions were within one of the enumerated set of 
circumstances qualifying for security exception. Because a crucial goal for 
the ITO was to limit unilateral government actions, U.S. negotiators did not 
seek to make  exceptions that would create an open-ended, unchecked pow-
er for the ITO Members.
Third, this article shows that the interaction between the U.S. delegation 
and other national delegations failed to explore the full depth of the con-
cerns that the U.S. DOS had with Members’ potential abuse of the security 
exceptions.48 For example, within the Geneva preparatory meetings, the na-
tional delegations did not elaborate on the legal interpretive questions that 
sparked heated debate within the U.S. delegation between the U.S. DOS and 
the Services officials.49
Instead, the national delegates considered the scope of the exceptions 
with respect to political interests and access to the nullification or impair-
ment procedure.50 Under this procedure, Members could seek relief when 
the benefits they received from the Charter were nullified or impaired by 
another Member’s security measures, regardless of whether the measure ac-
tually breached the Charter’s rules. By the time the delegates met in Havana 
months later to finalize the Charter and shortly after the signing of the 
GATT, they appeared in agreement that the procedure applied to excepted 
security actions. This finding is echoed in materials the DOS prepared for 
U.S. Congressional hearings on the ITO, whereby it was revealed that if 
Members were to withhold information mandated by the Charter on grounds 
of national security, the complainant Member retained the opportunity to 
file a “non-violation complaint” via the nullification or impairment proce-
dure.51
47. It appears that these two interpretive questions were placed together.
48. For the implications of this observation upon treaty interpretation, see infra note 61.
49. These questions included the proper placement of the phrase “relating to” within 
the exception provision and the most appropriate body to review disputes involving security 
measures. See infra Part V.
50. See also Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, The Historical References in the U.S. First Sub-
mission in United States—Certain Measures on Steel and Aluminum Products, INT’L ECON.
L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 6, 2019) (offering an expansion and comment on the context of the 
historical references made by the United States as related to the ITO Charter delegations’
drafting meetings), https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/10/the-historical-references-in-the-us-
first-submission-in-united-states-certain-measures-on-steel-and-.html.
51. See infra text accompanying note 529.
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Still, the absence of a detailed delegates’ discussion does not signal am-
bivalence to the kinds of issues that triggered heated exchanges between the 
DOS and Services officials. Just as the article demonstrates compromise 
within the U.S. agencies, it also demonstrates that the U.S. sought compro-
mise among the heterogenous delegations. For example, when delegations 
raised potential dangers with the exceptions in Geneva, the U.S. delegation 
remained fairly neutral, explaining how the language and phrasing of the 
enumerated exceptions chosen reflected the “balance” the U.S. sought when 
creating latitude for measures concerning “real security interests.”52 One 
reading of this history is that detailed interpretive assessments of the open-
ended language used to make the exceptions, like other interpretive issues, 
would be addressed following completion of the Charter.
The WTO will soon evaluate the merits of some of these U.S. security 
claims.53 Until then, the WTO is in peril in light of the Trump administra-
tion’s recurrent invocation of U.S. national security to support unilateral 
trade actions and its distrust of multilateralism generally.54 Moreover,  there 
is a growing “technological Cold War” between China and the United 
States, which is playing out in tit-for-tat defensive trade measures that fur-
ther tangle economic and security initiatives.55
Considering its role in founding the post-war international economy, it
is remarkable how the United States now invokes security in the pursuit of 
trade actions. The Trump administration has broadly used security concerns 
to defend the U.S. trade agenda, arguing that “national security is economic 
security.”56 It justifies its decisions to impose tariffs, government blacklists, 
and other defensive measures using this rationale.57 The repeated U.S. invo-
52. See infra text accompanying note 423.
53. See supra text accompanying note 22.
54. See generally Jacob Lew, Op-Ed., America is Surrendering the Moral High Ground 
Over Huawei, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2019); Quinn Slobodian, You Live in Robert Lighthizer’s
World Now, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 6, 2018); James Bacchus, Might Unmakes Right: The 
American Assault on the Rule of Law in World Trade (Ctr. For Int’l Governance Innovation 
Papers, No. 173, May 2018), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/might-unmakes-right; 
Nicolas Lamp, How Should We Think About the Winners and Losers from Globalization? 
Three Narratives and Their Implications for the Redesign of International Economic Agree-
ments (Nov. 26, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3290590; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How Should WTO Members Re-
act to Their WTO Crises?, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. 1–23 (May 24, 2019).
55. See Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, China’s Rise: How It Took on the U.S. at the 
WTO, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 179 (2018); Shawn Donnan & Jenny Leonard, Trump’s Lat-
est Tariffs Threat Betrays Impatience for a China Deal, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2019); Li Yu-
an, Huawei Feud Is Latest Brick in a Tech Wall, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (May 20, 2019); Raymond 
Zhong & Paul Mozur, For the U.S. and China, a Technology Cold War That’s Freezing Over,
N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Mar. 23, 2018); see also supra note 5.
56. Peter Navarro, Why Economic Security Is National Security, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/economic-security-national-security.
57. Ana Swanson & Paul Mozur, In Name of Security, Trump Sets Off Economic Wars 
on Multiple Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, at A8 (June 8, 2019). In addition to the tariffs on aluminium 
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cation of national security to justify its trade restrictive measures is more 
worrisome against the background of an ongoing U.S. challenge to the 
WTO Appellate Body’s legal interpretations and judicial practices, culmi-
nating in its efforts to block Appellate Body member appointments.58 As a 
result, WTO Members are left hoping to avoid a situation where “the 
strongest party to a dispute says [what] the rules are.”59
It is likely that future WTO panel reports will continue to build on the 
Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute and will therefore emphasize the prepara-
tory materials related to article XXI of the GATT. But, while the historical 
facts contained herein capture insights into the making of article XXI, the 
concern of this article is to offer perspective to current debates, not to make 
a formal interpretive claim about the GATT.60 Collectively, the insights cap-
tured in this article offer a historical lens by which to explore the reviewa-
bility of national security claims, but this article does not seek to resolve the 
interpretive legal questions presented or to confirm the standards by which 
the WTO’s adjudicative bodies should review claims under article XXI.61 In 
and steel, the Trump administration cited concerns with Japanese and European Union auto-
mobiles and automobile parts imports in 2018, raising the possibility of tariffs to protect U.S. 
competitiveness under section 232. Proclamation No. 9888, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,433 (May 17, 
2019); see also Jenny Leonard & Shawn Donnan, Trump Delays EU, Japan Auto Tariffs for 
180 Days for Talks, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2019). But see David Lawder, Trump Can No 
Longer Impose ‘Section 232’ Auto Tariffs After Missing Deadline: Experts, Reuters (Nov. 18, 
2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-autos/trump-can-no-longer-impose-
section-232-auto-tariffs-after-missing-deadline-experts-idUSKBN1XT0TK (explaining that 
the Trump administration failed to act by November 14, 2019 and has consequently missed 
the deadline to impose tariffs on certain automobile and automobile part imports). Similarly, 
the Trump administration threatened an emergency declaration to impose tariffs on the United 
States’ top trading partner, Mexico, in an effort to reduce illegal immigration into the U.S. See
Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The Legal Authority Behind Trump’s New Tariffs on 
Mexico, LAWFARE (June 3, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-
trumps-new-tariffs-mexico (outlining the dramatic use of the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act); Fred Barbash, Use of Emergency Declaration to Impose Tariffs on Mexi-




58. See Robert E. Lighthizer, The President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda, OFFICE OF 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE 22–28 (Mar. 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
Press/Reports/2018/AR/2018%20Annual%20Report%20I.pdf. See generally Petersmann, su-
pra note 54.
59. Peter Van den Bossche, Farewell Speech of Appellate Body Member Peter Van den 
Bossche, (May 28, 2019), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/farwellspeech_
peter_van_den_bossche_e.htm. 
60. While the subsequent evolution of U.S. thinking on the security exceptions is occa-
sionally touched upon, the U.S. stance in early GATT disputes is a separate story, told else-
where. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 11; Hahn, supra note 38; Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra
note 32.
61. This article does not consider how U.S. practice comes under the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties. In particular, the article does not argue that internal U.S. materials 
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fact, this article suggests that U.S. negotiators anticipated clarification of the 
standard of review based on the interpretation of a competent dispute set-
tlement body.62
II.  Establishing a Timeline for a Historical, 
Descriptive Account
The negotiation of the ITO began with a small group of states—the 
United States, the United Kingdom (the “UK”), and the Commonwealth 
states—during World War II. The United States presented its Suggested 
Charter for the ITO in September 1946, based on an outline of principles 
devised with the UK from 1941 to 1945.63 The subsequent work of the Pre-
paratory Committee of the United Nations (the “UN”) Conference on Trade 
and Employment was divided into three phases. There were two Preparatory 
Committee sessions, in London (1946) and in Geneva (1947), and a meeting 
of the Drafting Committee in New York (1947). Each meeting produced its 
own draft ITO Charter. The UN Conference on Trade and Employment was 
then held in Havana, Cuba in 1948. Annexed to the Final Act of the UN 
Conference was the final version of the Havana Charter, signed on March 
24, 1948.64
Within each of these sessions, participating delegations broke up into 
smaller committees and commissions that simultaneously addressed a range 
of topics based on the Suggested Charter, including non-discrimination and 
fairness, commodities, restrictive business practices, direct and indirect 
trade barriers, the response of the Soviet Union to the ITO, rules for rela-
tions with communist and state-trading economies, positive approaches to 
full employment, the role of occupied territories in the trading system, bal-
ance of payments difficulties and economic development, the interaction be-
tween the Bretton Woods institutions, and the role of dispute settlement in 
the ITO in relation to the World Court and the UN.
connote a collective effort of all participating governments or that they constitute a supple-
mentary means of interpreting article XXI under article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. See ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO
APPELLATE BODY 309, 313 (2009) (noting that “the proposition that preparatory work reflects 
the common intention of all contracting parties is troubling.”).
62. See Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 32, at 448; see also John H. Jackson, 
Helms-Burton, The U.S., and the WTO, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 3, 1997), https://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/2/issue/1/helms-burton-us-and-wto.
63. U.S. Dep’t. of State, pub. 2598, Suggested Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization of the United Nations (Sept. 1946) [hereinafter 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter].
64. U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana Charter for the International 
Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/78 (Apr. 1948) [hereinafter 1948 Havana Charter].
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Meanwhile, the negotiation of the GATT was completed on schedule, 
and twenty-three governments signed its Final Act on October 30, 1947.65
With the GATT concluded prior to the Havana Conference, certain elements 
from the finalized Havana Charter’s security exceptions article were not in-
cluded in the GATT. For example, the Havana Charter provision respecting 
inter-governmental agreements “made by or for a military establishment” 
was not included in the final GATT text, nor was the provision regarding 
the “special” circumstances of India and Pakistan as newly independent 
states.66 There were also minor textual changes to the security exceptions 
between the Havana Charter and the GATT. For example, the second enu-
merated subparagraph of the Havana Charter’s security exceptions article 
was simplified in article XXI GATT to allow “traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying 
a military establishment.”67
A. Identifying the Actors in the U.S. Government
As previewed above, not all U.S. postwar planners desired freer trade 
for global economic recovery and peace. The construction of the security 
exceptions captures a tense battle between the U.S. DOS and Services as to 
how to define post-war U.S. foreign economic policy. Services’ personnel, 
drawn from the War, Army, and Navy Departments were tasked with post-
war U.S. military and defense planning.68 Though both prioritized U.S. se-
curity, they did so in different ways. While the U.S. DOS championed mul-
tilateral approaches to trade liberalization and the norm of non-
discrimination, Services prioritized the U.S. expansion of power to counter 
rising concerns with Soviet actions in eastern Europe.69 While the DOS un-
65. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
30–35, 50 (2d ed. 1990). See generally DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL., THE GENESIS OF THE GATT
96 (2008).
66. 1948 Havana Charter, supra note 64, at 92–93; see also infra note 541.
67. GATT, supra note 8, at 39. In the Havana Charter, the text was “traffic in other
goods and materials carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment of the Member or of any other country.” 1948 Havana Charter, supra note 64, at 
93 (emphasis added).
68. These departments were unified under the National Military Establishment on July 
26, 1947 when President Truman signed the National Security Act of 1947.
69. Cf. Miller, Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 1939–1945, supra note 3, at 286 
(observing that just prior to the negotiation of the ITO, and therefore prior to negotiation of 
the GATT, U.S. negotiators were divided into factions with two distinct aims: “to open the 
world economy to suit their own expansionist commercial goals and liberal trade ideals (a 
predominantly selfish aim)” and “to pay the necessary price to accommodate war town econ-
omies and stabilise the international system (a more selfless aim that required economic sacri-
fices).”). Nevertheless, both factions believed their aims could be accomplished through the 
same means: liberalizing the world economy. Id.
Spring 2020] Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security 123
derstood national security as an exception to free trade rules, Services saw 
free trade as the exception, and national security was the rule.70
In fact, the crucial advocates for freer trade were the DOS officials that 
supported former Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s promotion of non-
discriminatory, open trade; these were led by William Clayton, Assistant 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.71 They “simply believed that 
freer trade would lead to global economic recovery and international har-
mony” and sought to “democratise . . . international capitalism.”72 Conse-
quently, DOS officials defended the ITO and trade liberalization as crucial 
ingredients to future U.S. security.73
That the DOS was responsible for managing the negotiation of the ITO 
Charter and the GATT helps to explain why the United States was ultimate-
ly willing to sacrifice (some) sovereignty for the benefits generated in a 
multilateral result.74 As Francine McKenzie observed, during that era 
“[t]rade was not just an instrument of foreign policy; it was also its expres-
sion.”75 Thus, the DOS was likely successful at tethering U.S. interests to 
trade multilateralism in large part because its negotiating lens fit the times: 
U.S. trade policy was seen as integrated into the country’s broader diplo-
matic efforts and long-term objectives for maintaining global peace, a path-
way for governments to identify common interests and to manage complex 
domestic and international pressures.
B. The Influence of the Cold War on Trade Negotiations
Several commentators have remarked that the ITO was “a product of 
the Cold War.”76 At the least, it is inescapable that the broader context of 
70. See generally infra parts III and V.
71. DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US TRADE 
POLICY 464 (2017); see Miller, Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 1939–1945, supra note 3,
at 12. Not every official in the State Department aligned with Hull’s goal of freer trade. Leroy 
Stinebower, an economist at the State Department reflected on how certain U.S. officials did 
not adhere to “[William] Clayton internationalism,” understood as a free trade approach. He 
further observed that “[Will Clayton] constantly came up against the less convinced, in Dean 
Acheson and Adloph Berle.” Oral History Interview by Richard D. McKinzie with 
Leroy Stinebower, Columbus, North Carolina, ¶¶ 12–13 (June 9, 1974), 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/stinebow.htm. 
72. Miller, Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 1939–1945, supra note 3, at 285–86.
73. Francine McKenzie, GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional De-
velopment, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959, 10 J. COLD WAR STUD. 78, 107 (2008) 
(finding the State Department was “pervaded by economics” and “formulated with Cold War 
aims in mind”) (citations omitted).
74. See generally Miller, Wartime Origins of Multilateralism, 1939–1945, supra note 
3, at 14, 15–17 (arguing that U.S. officials pursued multilateralism in trade from 1941 to 1945 
as a result of “their own ideals, and British influence”).
75. Id. at 107.
76. Compare THOMAS W. ZEILER, FREE TRADE, FREE WORLD: THE ADVENT OF 
GATT 138 (1999) with McKenzie, supra note 73, at 79 (interviewing former GATT negotia-
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ITO Charter negotiation occurred against the “birth” of the Cold War be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.77 The majority of the discus-
sion of the language and phrasing of the security exceptions occurred at a 
time when the United States and the Soviet Union seemed “irrevocably 
committed to securing their respective spheres of influence—politically, 
economically, and militarily—without mutual consultation.”78
Nonetheless, despite the U.S. perception that the Soviet Union repre-
sented an ideological, political, and economic threat, the DOS’s support for 
trade multilateralism in the late 1940s was not so easily compartmentalized. 
Traditional reasons, including the U.S. goal of strengthening the West 
against “the threat of communism”79 and the effort “to prevent a revival of 
the closed autarkic systems that had contributed to world depression,”80 fed 
into each other. The U.S.’s “ideological” conflict against “the totalitarian-
communist identity of the Soviet Union”81 was supported by American “po-
litical and business elites” who were active in “promoting liberal capitalism 
and democracy as the international model.”82 However, revisionist histori-
ans also expose the complexity of U.S. post-war planning, observing a U.S. 
“strategic-economic” quest for “expanding empire in the 1940s not simply 
as a reaction to Soviet machinations but as another and more accelerated 
step in a long imperial journey from continental to global power.”83 In sum, 
the reasoning of the United States should be understood as a composite of 
accounts from different actors that considers their behaviors, philosophies, 
actions, and ambitions within international economic law at the dawn of the 
Cold War.84
The Cold War did play a role in the formation of the Charter and the se-
curity exceptions, of course, but its impact started out slowly. Early U.S. 
tors and revealing that “Cold War politics” did not affect trade liberalization efforts). See gen-
erally ROBERT A. POLLARD, ECONOMIC SECURITY AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR,
1945–1950, at 201 (1985); Michael Mastanduno, Trade as a Strategic Weapon: American and 
Alliance Export Control Policy in the Early Postwar Period 42 INT’L ORG. 121, 125 (1988); 
Jacob Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 612 (1947). 
77. STEIL, supra note 45, at 135.
78. Id.
79. See I. MAC DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (4th ed. 2005) at 7; see also
IRWIN, supra, note 71, at 495.
80. POLLARD, supra note 76, at 244; see Thomas G. Paterson & Les K. Adler, Red 
Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitar-
ianism, 1930’s–1950’s, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 1046–64 (1970) (exploring U.S. perceptions of 
totalitarianism and how it impacted U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union).
81. ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 21 (2001). 
82. Sandrine Kott, Cold War Internationalism, in 15 INTERNATIONALISMS: A
TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY 340, 346 (Glenda Sluga & Patricia Clavin eds., 2016).
83. Thomas G. Paterson, Cold War Revisionism: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 31(3) 
DIP. HIST. 387, 391 (2007).
84. See e.g., STEIL, supra note 45.
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and UK efforts sought to include the Soviet Union, a state-trading economy, 
into the multilateral trade system.85 The severity of the Cold War does not 
appear to have crystallized in U.S. officials’ minds prior to the “shock” of 
the North Korean invasion of South Korea.86 Before that time, Services offi-
cials were primarily concerned with the Soviet Union’s exploitation of the 
“dramatic unraveling of the geopolitical foundations” in Europe and in 
Asia.87
Nevertheless, despite not completely expecting Soviet “military con-
quest” in the late 1940s, U.S. Services officials shaped an expansive con-
ception of U.S. national security in estimation of Soviet capabilities.88 Pro-
fessor Melvyn Leffler, an expert in U.S. foreign relations history, described 
U.S. military officials as broadening the conception of U.S. national security 
to include “a strategic sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere,” 
a system of bases and transit rights, “access to the resources and markets of 
most of Eurasia,” nuclear “superiority,” and denial of strategic materials and 
resources to “prospective” enemies.89
As elaborated below, tensions mounted and, as historian Thomas Zeiler 
observed, the United States ultimately sought to combine its foreign and 
economic policy to “contain the expansion of Soviet-directed international 
communism.”90 Yet, as this article will explain, growing U.S.-Soviet ten-
sions did not lead to an expansion of the security exceptions as commenta-
tors might expect. Instead, the emerging Cold War placed an urgency on the 
U.S. negotiators’ plans to sell trade multilateralism—both to other delega-
tions and back home in Washington. To champion trade liberalization and 
procedural multilateralism—seen as the creation of “a talking shop” for de-
veloping shared policy91—the U.S. negotiators sought to circumscribe the 
exceptions. The DOS officials that served as U.S. negotiators sought to con-
vince other U.S. officials that gaining the fullest benefits from ITO mem-
bership required closing the opportunity for unbridled government regula-
tion and protectionism, even in the name of national security. To achieve 
this end, compromises were made between the various U.S. agencies, par-
ticularly the DOS and Services. These compromises were a considerable 
challenge at the time of negotiation, with “lingering isolationism” within the 
85. James N. Miller, Origins of the GATT—British Resistance to American Multilater-
alism 18, n.30 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper, No. 318, 2000). 
86. THOMAS OATLEY, A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY: BUILDUPS,
BOOMS, AND BUSTS 48–49 (2015).
87. Melvyn P. Leffler, America’s National Security Policy: A Source of Cold War Ten-
sions, in THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 83 (Thomas G. Paterson & Robert J. McMahon 
eds., 3d ed. 1991).
88. Id. at 85–86.
89. Id. at 90.
90. ZEILER, supra note 76, at 76.
91. See Miller, Origins of the GATT—British Resistance to American Multilateralism,
supra note 85, at 9.
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U.S. government,92 and several U.S. officials skeptical of “liberal ideals and 
capitalist institutions.”93
III.  Preparing for Trade Multilateralism: The Suggested 
Charter and the Initial U.S. Construction of 
the National Security Exception
Within the United States, post-war foreign economic policy was man-
aged by an inter-departmental committee, the Executive Committee on Eco-
nomic Foreign Policy (“ECEFP”), which itself was subdivided into smaller 
committees that considered economic, territorial, and security problems 
through coordination between the Departments of State, War, Navy, and 
others.94 As a general matter, the ECEFP sought international cooperation to 
“maximize the production and exchange of goods,” to “prevent future 
wars,” and to avoid “measures of economic warfare.”95
During World War II, before the United States shared its Suggested 
Charter on the world stage, the ECEFP considered solutions for a multilat-
eral economic approach to post-war recovery internally. A multilateral ap-
proach was meant to aid all governments transitioning from wartime con-
trols.96 The ECEFP believed that international trade rules would facilitate 
the “expansion of world trade” needed by Member States to address the po-
litical realities of unemployment, balance-of-payments, or other economic 
problems.97 Consequently, though it recognized the need for states to take 
defensive action, any security exceptions still had to fit within a larger con-
stellation of political and economic goals for trade multilateralism in post-
war planning.
The ECEFP drew from past U.S. trade agreements and discussions with 
British and Canadian officials to form the earliest proposals for a multilat-
92. ZEILER, supra note 76, at 78.
93. Leffler, supra note 87, at 87.
94. See Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, 10 Dep’t St. Bull. 507, 511 
(1944); see also ROBERT W. OLIVER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND THE 
WORLD BANK 102–03 (1975); HARLEY A. NOTTER, POSTWAR FOREIGN POLICY 
PREPARATION, 1939-1945, at 222–23, 357–58 (1949). 
95. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy 
[“ECEFP”], Letter from Comm. On Trade Barriers [“CTB”] on Proposed Multilateral Con-
vention on Commercial Policy, ECEFP D-62/44, at 1–2. (Oct. 4, 1944) [hereinafter Letter 
from CTB to ECEFP on Proposed Multilateral Convention, 1944] (on file with NACP, record 
group 59, box 46, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP: Meetings, Documents 61/44-/9’).
96. See U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Committee on Wartime Trade Controls, Rep. on 
Basic Foreign Commercial Policy and Wartime Trade Controls, ECEFP D-61/44, at 4 (Sept. 
28, 1944) (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 46, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP: Meetings, 
Documents 61/44/9’).
97. Letter from CTB to ECEFP on Proposed Multilateral Convention, 1944, supra note 
95, at 2–3.
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eral convention on commercial policy.98 The security exceptions in particu-
lar, appear to be inspired by both the U.S.-Argentina reciprocal trade 
agreement and the U.S.-Mexico reciprocal trade agreement.
The reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Argenti-
na incorporated a general exception that divided national concerns into two 
groups. First, explicitly without prejudice to states’ commitments to engage 
in consultation or third-party adjudication (by a committee of technical ex-
perts), actions “relative to public security” and “public health and morals,” 
among others, were excepted.99 This first group of excepted concerns was 
qualified by a commitment against “arbitrary discrimination.”100 The second 
group of national security actions permitted by the exceptions included 
“control of the export or sale for export of arms, ammunition, or implements 
of war, and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military supplies” and 
those “relating to neutrality.”101 Unlike the language of the first group of ex-
ceptions, the language of this group did not directly reference consultation 
or third-party adjudication.  Moreover, these security actions were permitted 
without qualification (meaning they were not controlled by a prefatory 
clause restricting “arbitrary discrimination”), and were introduced as fol-
lows: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement of such measures as the Government of either country may 
see fit.”102
By comparison, article XVII of the Agreement between the United 
States of America and Mexico Respecting Reciprocal Trade, which entered 
into force on January 30, 1943, stated: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of measures . . . relating to 
public security, or imposed for the protection of the country’s essential in-
terests in time of war or other national emergency.”103 There was no separa-
tion between different types of national concerns, and it was unclear wheth-
er article XVII was subject to article XIV, which outlined a procedure for 
either government to seek adjustment of measures believed to nullify or im-
98. Letter from CTB to ECEFP on Proposed Multilateral Convention, 1944, supra note 
95, at 1.
99. Agreement and Supplemental Exchange of Notes Between the United States of 
America and Argentina Respecting Reciprocal Trade, arts. XV(1), XVI(1), U.S.-Arg., Oct. 14, 
1941, E.A.S, 277, 56 Stat. 1685, 1698–1701 [hereinafter U.S.-Arg. Agreement, Oct. 14, 
1941]. 
100. Id. The chapeau of art. XV(1) reads: “Subject to the requirement that, under like 
circumstances and conditions, there shall be no arbitrary discrimination by either country 
against the other country in favour of any third country . . . the provisions of this Agreement 
shall not extend to prohibitions or restrictions.”
101. Id.
102. Id. art. XV(2). The language of “qualified” and “unqualified” emerged from elabo-
ration on the kinds of exceptions present in past trade agreements during later ECEFP meet-
ings. See infra notes 266, 285.
103. Agreement between the United States of America and Mexico Respecting Recipro-
cal Trade, U.S.-Mex., art. XVII(h) Dec. 23, 1942, 57 Stat. 833, 850 (1942). 
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pair objects of the agreement. Just as under the U.S.-Argentina agreement, 
excepted national security actions were not limited by a prefatory clause, 
but the U.S.-Mexico agreement provision included open-ended language re-
lated to “other national emergency” not present in the U.S.-Argentina 
agreement.
By 1944, the ECEFP had drafted its initial proposal for a multilateral 
convention. Security-related exceptions were contained in draft article 
XXVIII (General Exceptions). They were unqualified, with a few key 
changes.104 Article XXVII provided, inter alia:
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement of measures:
. . .
(c) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of 
war, and, in exceptional circumstances, all other military sup-
plies;
. . .
(h) [measures] undertaken in pursuance of obligations for the 
maintenance of international peace or security; . . . .105
Subparagraph (c) resembled language found in past U.S. trade agree-
ments,106 while the ECEFP explained that subparagraph (h) was original to 
its proposal and meant to “replace” language in inter-war trade agreements 
“relating to (unilateral) ‘neutrality’ and ‘public security’ measures  and
measures imposed ‘in time of war or other emergency.’”107 The proposal 
targeted the open-ended language contained in prior agreements that permit-
ted exception for measures unrelated to war actions and purposefully reject-
ed expanding the scope of the security exceptions to permit “action under 
emergency situations.”108 Further, the ECEFP confirmed its position that 
“the scope of the exception should properly be restricted to situations in-
104. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Analysis of the Draft Text of the Proposed Multilateral 
Convention on Commercial Policy, ECEFP D-64/44, at 63 (Oct. 1944), [hereinafter Analysis 
of the Proposed Multilateral Convention] (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 46, A1 
353, file ‘ECEFP: Meetings, Documents 61/44-/9’) (analyzing key changes between the initial 
ECEFP proposal and earlier U.S. trade agreements).
105. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Draft Text of the Proposed Multilateral Convention on 
Commercial Policy, ECEFP D-63/44, at 44 (Oct. 1944) (on file with NACP, record group 59,
box 46, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP: Meetings, Documents 61/44-/9’) (the bracketed text signaled a 
drafting suggestion). 
106. Analysis of the Proposed Multilateral Convention, supra note 104, at 63 (identifica-
tion of which past U.S. trade agreements were consulted was not provided).
107. Id. at 63–64.
108. Id. at 64.
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volving war or the threat of war, which would be covered by (h).”109 For 
clarity, the security exceptions would “not extend to national emergencies 
of any other kind, such as those produced by depressions.”110
A.  The Suggested Charter’s Security Exceptions
By 1945, the ECEFP was working towards a draft convention for a 
United Nations organ to construct “agreed principles” and “an equitable ba-
sis for dealing with the problems of governmental measures affecting inter-
national trade.”111 This organ, the ITO, would establish machinery for col-
laboration, but it was not described as an international body meant to police 
protectionism.112
In 1946, following the 1944 ECEFP proposal, an ECEFP sub-
committee, the Trade Agreements Committee (“TAC”), was tasked with 
constructing the initial charter for the ITO for the Secretary of State’s use 
when negotiating with other governments.
The TAC was divided over its final proposal to the ECEFP. A majority 
of the TAC, largely DOS officials, offered security exceptions maintaining 
the ITO’s trade liberalization goals.113 The Services Departments offered a 
dissenting, minority report that was attached to the majority TAC state-
ment.114
The security exceptions recommended by the TAC read, inter alia:
Nothing in Chapter IV of this Charter shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures . . .
b. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, implements of 
war and fissionable materials;
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Proposal to Establish an International Trade Organiza-
tion, marked Secret, ECEFP D-108/45, at 13 (July 21, 1945) (on file with NACP, record 
group 59, box 48, A1 353, file ‘5.19B ECEFP Meetings, Documents 101/45 – 110.45’) (con-
taining security exceptions similar to those in the ECEFP’s 1944 Draft Text of the Proposed 
Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy).
112. Id. at 5.
113. See U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Trade Agreement Comm. (“TAC”) on Exceptions 
for Security Measures, ECEFP D-42/46 (May 27, 1946) [hereinafter TAC Statement on Ex-
ceptions for Security Measures] (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 33, A1 497, file 
‘Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy’).
114. See Harold H. Neff and H.L. Challenger, Memorandum, Attachment to TAC 
Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, ECEFP D-42/46, at 2 (June 10, 1946) [here-
inafter Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 13, A1 698, file ‘Charter: Security’).
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c. in time of war or imminent threat of war, relating to the 
protection of the essential security interests of a Member;
. . .
j. undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of in-
ternational peace or security.115
B.  The Services Departments’ Dissent: Requesting a 
Broader Security Exception
Harold Hopkins Neff (a lawyer with international law and business ex-
perience, and Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of War, serving as 
representative of the War Department) and Captain H.L. Challenger (of the 
U.S. Navy) presented the Services’ dissent to the TAC majority’s security 
exceptions proposal.116 The Services Departments sought wide discretion for 
all security measures, with a broad understanding of what constitutes U.S. 
national security.117 The Services Departments’ overarching thesis was that 
the proposed security exceptions were “much too narrow” and failed to pre-
serve the United States’ necessary powers.118 According to Neff, it was cru-
cial that the United States address the “depleted” raw materials required for 
U.S. security with the power “to control trade”—both to conserve these re-
sources domestically and to develop such resources “nearby” or in “friendly 
countries.”119
Yet, Services’ concerns stretched beyond the scope of the security ex-
ceptions. It became clear that the Services Departments viewed the excep-
tions as the chief tool for escaping the ITO’s legal and “moral” obligations 
to enable access to materials “on equal terms” as “needed [by Members] for 
115. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 1–2.
116. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP M-
16/46, at 6 (June 14, 1946) [hereinafter ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946] (on file with 
NACP, record group 59, box 57, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Minutes 16/46 – 33/46’). For a biog-
raphy of Neff, see generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Harold Hopkins Neff Biographic Data, at-
tached to Office Memorandum from L.D. Heck to Mr. Swayzee (May 5, 1947) (on file with 
NACP, record group 43, box 132, A1 704, file ‘Biographies part 1’); see also Harold H. Neff, 
Memorandum on the study of the London Stock Exchange, S.E.C. ARCHIVES (June 27, 1941),
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1940/1941_0627_NeffCommission.pdf.
117. See Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Se-
curity Measures, supra note 114, at 1.
118. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 1.
119. Id. at 1–2. Neff did not clarify his comment about the depletion of resources, 
though against the context of the memorandum, it appears he was speaking to those war mate-
rials essential for U.S. defense and military interests. See Neff and Challenger Memo attached 
to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 114.
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their economic prosperity.”120 Additionally, as elaborated below, Services 
desired sole discretion to draw on trade powers in peacetime to control im-
ports and exports, to make strategic Government purchases abroad, and to 
impose economic sanctions on ITO members.121
1. Accounting for New Technology and New Weapons
Services wanted the Suggested Charter to contain language similar to 
that in past U.S. commercial treaties and trade agreements that offered argu-
ably broad national security protections.122 According to Neff, those treaties 
used open-ended legal phrases, including exceptions for measures relating 
to “public security,” and those relating to “all other military supplies” in 
“exceptional circumstances.”123
Instead, the TAC replaced the language “and in exceptional circum-
stances, all other military supplies” from past trade agreements with new 
language (covering a narrower subset of military supplies: “fissionable ma-
terials”) in the security exception provision.124 In dissent, Neff argued that 
reserving the exception “to munitions of war and fissionable raw materials 
does not appear realistic.”125 He argued that the narrowness of the proposed 
language ignored the possibility of discovering “some new technology” or 
material for new weapons of war.126 Moreover, the history of U.S. neutrality
legislation, Neff countered, demonstrated that security interests “cannot be 
realistically limited to munitions of war.”127 Petroleum and metals, for ex-
ample, were equally important.128
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2–3; see TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 
113, at 3; Clair Wilcox, Memorandum to Dean Acheson and Will Clayton on National Securi-
ty Exceptions to Draft ITO Charter, at 2 (July 8, 1946) [hereinafter Wilcox Memorandum to 
Acheson and Clayton] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 13, A1 698, file ‘Charter: 
Security’). Clair Wilcox, a U.S. economist from the faculty of Swarthmore College, both 
served as head negotiator for the ITO Charter and chaired the International Trade Conference 
that resulted in the GATT 1947. See Joshua Hausman, One Hundred Years of Economics at 
Swarthmore, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE (2005), http://www.swarthmore.edu/sites/default/files/
assets/documents/economics/econ_history.pdf.
122. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 1, 7–8.
123. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 2; Neff 
and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra
note 114, at 7–8. 
124. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 2-3.
125. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 2.
126. Id. at 3; see ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 2. 
127. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 2.
128. Id. at 2–3.
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Neff and the TAC majority also disagreed on whether the language of 
“public security,” as included in prior U.S. trade agreements (but excluded 
in the TAC statement), referred solely to “domestic police measures” and 
“police powers” alone.129 Neff argued that the terms “public security” 
should be included and read broadly, to permit all “necessary powers to 
control trade.”130 The TAC majority rejected this expansive understanding of 
the terms “public security.”131 The DOS observed the phrase “public securi-
ty” ought to be interpreted “very narrowly to cover only matters affecting 
public safety or order.”132 John Leddy (Trade Agreements Division, State 
Department)133 added that prior trade agreements only authorized measures 
“required in the face of a clear and present danger to the national securi-
ty.”134 The TAC also referred to the United States’ narrow interpretation of 
the phrase in the past, with specific attention to the United States’ position 
during the 1927 Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibi-
tions and Restrictions.135
2. Export Restrictions
The Services Departments argued that export restrictions, such as those 
“designed to conserve domestic supplies of scarce materials necessary in 
war or designed to prevent supplies from reaching a possible U.S. enemy,” 
129. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 1–2; Wilcox Memo-
randum to Acheson and Clayton, supra note 121, at 2.
130. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 1–2.
131. See TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 6.
132. Winthrop G. Brown, U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter to William Clayton on behalf of 
Clair Wilcox, National Security Exceptions in the ITO Charter, at 6 (June 13, 1946) [hereinaf-
ter Wilcox Letter to Clayton] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 13, A1 698, file 
‘Charter: Security’).
133. In London, Leddy served as an advisor to the U.S. delegation for the commercial 
policy chapter of the ITO Charter, which later formed the GATT 1947. See Oral History In-
terview by Richard D. McKinzie with John M. Leddy, Washington, D.C., HARRY S. TRUMAN 
PRES. LIBR. & MUSEUM, ¶¶ 44–45 (June 15, 1973) [hereinafter Leddy Oral History]; see also
Oral History Interview by Richard D. McKinzie with Honore Marc Catudal, Washington, 
D.C., HARRY S. TRUMAN PRES. LIBR. & MUSEUM, ¶ 59 (May 23, 1973); John Marshall Led-
dy Dies, Obituary, WASH. POST (Sep. 3, 1997), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
local/1997/09/03/john-marshall-leddy-dies/53943cdd-9046-41a0-8085-6e1ce9cd634e/
?utm_term=.53d57e88c2d1. Leddy’s views mattered; he was deeply respected by other State 
Department officials for his skills as a drafter and negotiator. See Oral History Interview by 
Richard D. McKinzie with Joseph D. Coppock, Washington, D.C., HARRY S. TRUMAN PRES.
LIBR. & MUSEUM, ¶¶ 46–47 (July 29, 1974), (“John Leddy was one of the greatest, one of the 
really greatest, most knowledgeable people in State for many years.”); Oral History Interview 
by Richard D. McKinzie with Winthrop G. Brown, Washington D.C., HARRY S TRUMAN 
PRES. LIBR. & MUSEUM, ¶¶ 43–44 (May 25, 1973) [hereinafter Brown Oral History].
134. John Leddy, U.S. Dep’t of State, Draft Letter to William Clayton on behalf of Clair 
Wilcox, at 1 (June 13, 1946) [hereinafter Wilcox Draft Letter to Clayton] (on file with NACP, 
record group 43, box 13, A1 698, file ‘Charter: Security’).
135. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 6.
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were essential to U.S. security interests and appeared prohibited by the pro-
posed Charter.136 The TAC had argued that its proposed security exceptions 
permitted the United States to take certain export restrictions “to conserve 
supplies of exhaustible natural resources,” rather than a blanket permit to 
take any export restriction as this would “clearly open the door to discrimi-
natory or protectionist measures.”137 Services disagreed. According to Ser-
vices, the Charter only permitted the levying of export duties.138 Without an 
expansive set of security exceptions, the ITO asymmetrically weakened the 
United States,139 as other ITO members lacked the United States’ constitu-
tional prohibitions on levying export duties.140 From Services’ perspective, 
such “renunciation” of powers was problematic because it would require the 
nullification of U.S. statutes (e.g., statutes relating to the export of tinplate 
scrap and helium gas) that were designed to “guard [U.S.] war potential” 
and “to keep from increasing the war potential of a possible enemy,” and it 
limited action in the name of these goals in the future.141 Neff “discounted” 
DOS’s arguments that export restrictions imposed for national security rea-
sons, could lead to retaliation and, consequently, a denial of strategic mate-
rials.142 Neff observed that other countries would still trade with the United 
States to obtain currency.143
3. Import Restrictions
Under the majority’s proposal, the U.S. government could not rely on 
broad forms of quantitative import restrictions to protect certain industries, 
with, for example, “specification controls” like mixing regulations for the 
protection of the synthetic rubber industry.144 Industries necessary in war 
should not, the TAC majority observed, “be maintained  through the use 
of . . . direct barriers to trade.”145 In contrast, the Services Departments 
wanted the freedom to impose mixing regulations or other quantitative im-
port restrictions “to assure the maintenance of a domestic industry . . . nec-
essary in war.”146
136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 5.
138. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 3.
139. Id. at 3. 
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Arti-
cles exported from any State.”)
141. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 4.
142. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 2.
143. Id. at 2.
144. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 3; ECEFP 
Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 3.
145. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 5.
146. Id. at 3.
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Services also rejected the TAC majority’s assessment that the U.S. gov-
ernment could achieve its security goals through subsidies and government 
operation instead. Neff argued that these choices were unacceptable due to 
the uncertainty created by the dependence on government appropriations.147
The Services Departments also complained that the ITO would require re-
porting the use of internal subsidy programs to other governments, as well 
as consultations to limit any subsidy program that caused any “serious ef-
fects on international trade,” even if for national security reasons.148 Thus, 
according to the Services Departments it was “dangerous” to “make such 
[an] undertaking in regard to a subsidy program based on national security 
reasons.”149
4. Strategic Purchasing
The Services Departments also sought total discretion for the U.S. gov-
ernment to apply strategic considerations in effecting foreign purchases.150
Counter to the Charter’s rules of non-discrimination and Member States’ 
commitment that “all nations shall be treated fairly and equitably,” Services 
believed that trade discrimination was necessary for U.S. security.151 Specif-
ically, the U.S. might need to make discriminatory purchases for strategic 
reasons, citing the examples of petroleum and the tropical products of natu-
ral rubber, abaca, and cinchona.152 According to the TAC majority, Services 
desired the power to make discriminatory purchasing by state trading (e.g.,
of government stockpiles) to either allow the United States to minimize its 
use of “near-by foreign sources of scarce materials needed in war” or “to 
help maintain in neighboring or near-by countries a possibly noneconomic 
industry producing materials or goods necessary in war.”153 To give an ex-
ample of the wide-ranging powers sought, where “normal civilian consump-
tion” required consumption of products from abroad (such as petroleum), 
Services believed the U.S. government should seek to fulfill this demand 
with “Government purchases abroad” in an effort to maintain supply closer 
147. Id.; Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Secu-
rity Measures, supra note 114, at 4–5.
148. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 5.
149. Id. An unnamed State Department official reviewing the Neff and Challenger 
memo had handwritten “Nuts!” next to this comment, underlining the word “dangerous.”
150. Id.
151. Id. An unnamed State Department official handwrote, “Good!” next to this com-
ment.
152. Id. at 5–6. For a further investigation as to how the U.S. government resolved its 
demand for rubber by creating a synthetic rubber industry, see generally DANIEL 
IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER UNITED STATES, 262–
77 (2019).
153. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 3.
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to the U.S., such as in Latin America.154 However, Services saw this strate-
gic consideration as restricted by the Charter’s non-discrimination rules, the 
obligation it imposed on states to treat all nations “fairly” when making 
Government purchases, and its requirement that such purchases be “based 
on commercial considerations alone.”155 An unnamed DOS official argued
that this failed to achieve Services’ desired effect: “Purchase of oil in the 
Middle East rather than in Venezuela would not keep Venezuelan oil in the 
ground.”156 Likewise, Services argued that any attempt to link subsidies or 
loans to those governments that produce tropical materials with “an obliga-
tion to deliver the products” to the United States would violate the Charter’s 
commitment to “fair and equitable treatment” to all ITO Members.157
Another vocal concern raised by Services was how responsive the Unit-
ed States could be to Russia. For free-market economies, the Charter im-
posed strict commitments to prohibit trade controls. However, states with 
direct government control over trade could make all of their export and im-
port decisions based on strategic considerations, such that “prohibitions 
against trade controls would be meaningless.”158 The “vague” obligations of 
state monopolies to provide “equal and fair treatment” to the trade of other 
ITO Members would be difficult to enforce. To the TAC majority, however, 
this concern “did not seem particularly significant” because Russia and its 
satellite states accounted for only five percent of world trade at that time.159
5. The Jurisdiction of the UN Security Council over Economic 
Disarmament
Services believed that “renunciation” of those trade powers necessary 
for security reasons constituted economic disarmament that was indistin-
guishable from general disarmament, and therefore fell under the jurisdic-
tion of the United Nations’ Security Council, where the U.S. held great 
power with weighted representation and a veto right.160 In support of this 
claim, Neff argued that “the failure by the Allied nations to destroy the 
German economic potential for war as well as German armaments following 
World War I was a convincing demonstration of the fallacy of separating 
economic disarmament from general disarmament.”161
154. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 5.
155. Id.
156. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 3.
157. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 6.
158. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 3.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security 
Measures, supra note 114, at 7; ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 3. 
161. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 116, at 3. 
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Services also argued it was in U.S. security interests that U.S. allies not 
renounce their powers affecting national security. For example, Neff and 
Challenger observed that it was in U.S. interests that “Great Britain have 
complete power to support her domestic agriculture by the measures which 
at the time she deems most appropriate.”162
A related argument put forward by Services was the desire to
“unilaterally” impose economic sanctions, regardless of whether “there 
should be war or imminent threat of war.”163 Proposals relating to unilateral 
economic sanctions were concerning for the DOS. An undated memoran-
dum provided the DOS position that Services’ response to the TAC pro-
posal, “assumes that any aspect of military security, no matter how remote 
or indirect, must override all consideration of economic and social well-
being,” an assumption that “is wholly at variance with our established for-
eign policy.”164
C.  The TAC Majority’s Defense of the ITO
After “lengthy discussion” in the ECEFP, the TAC majority observed 
that the Services Departments’ understanding of national security constitut-
ed “the maximum which could be included without seriously jeopardizing 
the expansion of world trade which the Charter seeks to bring about.”165
However, these exceptions were “firmly” rejected by the TAC majority.166
Instead, the TAC majority repeatedly defended the ITO and the trading 
world they sought to establish—one that would not include states’ open-
ended power “to make economic preparations for war in the indefinite fu-
ture.”167
Clair Wilcox of the DOS reported that for the TAC majority, the Ser-
vices Departments’ desired national security exceptions sought to amplify 
the United States’ powers and to “curb the military potential of other pow-
ers.”168 DOS officials viewed such measures as undermining, possibly de-
stroying, the international legal framework for peaceful economic and polit-
ical relations.169
The TAC majority argued that a successful ITO would better protect 
U.S. security interests than a broad security exception provision. They re-
162. Id.
163. Neff and Challenger Memo attached to TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security
Measures, supra note 114, at 3. Specific mention is made to past proposals for export embar-
goes to Argentina and Spain, but no further details are included in the memorandum.
164. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Undated Memorandum Commenting on the ITO Char-
ter [hereinafter Unauthored and Undated ECEFP Memorandum] (on file with NACP, record 
group 43, box 13, A1 698, file ‘Charter: Security’).
165. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 4.  
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Wilcox Memorandum to Acheson and Clayton, supra note 121.
169. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 4.
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marked that a “Charter for world trade with real teeth in it” would “contrib-
ute far more to the security of the United States than the reservation of 
broad freedom of action by all signatories.”170 To this end, Winthrop Brown 
argued that the proposed security exceptions protected “legitimate security 
interests” and the United States “against arbitrary actions by others to our 
detriment for political or economic warfare reasons.”171 In addition, such a 
Charter would strengthen “all the nations outside the Soviet orbit . . . and 
[help] to keep a free enterprise system.”172 Thus, as Clair Wilcox (who led 
the Office of International Trade Policy at the State Department and resided 
in the TAC majority) explained, the United States’ strength “depends on the 
integration of the non-collectivist world into a great trading system. It is to 
our interest to preclude exceptions under the Charter which might result in 
its breaking up into exclusive trading blocs.”173
Nevertheless, the TAC majority did not discount the vital character of 
states’ security interests.174 They knew that states would undertake necessary 
security measures, regardless of possible infringement of the Charter.175
However, they strived to meet the need for security exceptions while still 
avoiding the promotion of unilateral actions, which ran counter to the goals 
of trade multilateralism. Thus, the TAC majority’s proposed security excep-
tions permitted several measures necessary for U.S. security interests, pro-
vided that certain “safeguards” against opportunistic and protectionist uses 
were met. For example, subsidies remained an option for maintaining neces-
sary war industries, provided Services could make “the case for action on 
security grounds” to Congress.176 Moreover, the DOS argued that provisions 
encouraging multilateral dialogue and transparency, such as requirements 
for reporting or consulting on subsidy programs, “commit[] no member in 
advance to take limiting action as a result.”177 Additionally, ITO members 
could take trade actions for security reasons under the auspices of the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council, finding “agreement among the principal pow-
ers on the Security Council for the retention of key industries in key are-
as.”178 Finally, controls over trade in fissionable materials, as well as arms, 
ammunition, and implements of war were “specifically excepted” from the 
Charter.179
170. Id. at 7.
171. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 115, at 1.
172. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 6.
173. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 115.
174. See TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 4.
175. Id.
176. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 4–5. 
177. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 4 (emphasis removed).
178. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 5.
179. Id. at 6.
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A significant DOS concern with the Services’ dissent was that other 
states might use the security exceptions for “every form of discriminatory 
and restrictive practice”180—not just military measures. For example, Wil-
cox raised the possibility that less-developed states would claim economic 
development and industrialization as “essential to their ultimate national se-
curity” to justify the use of quantitative restrictions.181 A broadened excep-
tion provision could “give general sanction to the kind of measures envis-
aged by the service members [and] could be held to justify, for example, the 
high-cost industrialization of India behind tariff barriers, or the maintenance 
of high-cost British agriculture by means of quotas.”182 In this way, “every 
special interest in every other country would clothe itself in the mantle of 
national defense.”183 Thus, strategically, the TAC majority observed that it 
was in the United States’ best interest to “prevent[] other countries from im-
posing harmful trade measures against the United States,” and this “far out-
weigh[ed] the risk involved in committing [the U.S.] along with other coun-
tries to the relaxation of trade controls.”184
Another issue the DOS raised was the fear that a blanket exception for 
national security would “open the door to economic warfare and to the use 
of economic power for purely political reasons.”185 DOS officials and U.S. 
businesses separately referenced concerns over “economic war” between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.186 Echoing this concern, Wilcox later 
recounted, there were “two roads leading to industrial power,” and it was 
imperative that other trading nations follow the United States road, rather 
than the Soviet one.187 In light of all of these reasons, it was no surprise that 
the TAC majority argued that the Services Departments’ proposal for wid-
ening the scope of the security exceptions was “unnecessary, unwise, and 
possibly dangerous, to carry forward in a multilateral code of commercial 
behavior.”188
180. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 6.
181. Id. at 6 (India, Brazil, and Australia are specifically named); see ECEFP Meeting 
Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 115 at 5. 
182. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 6.
183. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 6. 
184. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note , at 6.
185. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 6.
186. See, e.g., Clair Wilcox, Statement on Quantitative Restrictions by Vice Chairman of 
U.S. Delegation, 18 DEP’T ST. BULL. 37, 40 (1948); John Abbink, The Issues at Havana and 
What the Charter Came to Look Like, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTE ON AMERICA AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 16 (1948).
187. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 141 (1972).
188. TAC Statement on Exceptions for Security Measures, supra note 113, at 7.
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D.  Finding Compromise: Adding Open-Ended Language to the ITO 
Security Exceptions
In a June 14, 1946 ECEFP meeting, the TAC majority challenged Ser-
vices to reconsider the expansion of the security exceptions. The contention 
that the United States would be “less secure by advocating commitments by 
all countries of the world completely overlooks what other countries give up 
and bind themselves to do,” the majority observed, “and the fact that they 
are more apt to try to use loopholes in discriminatory ways than we.”189 It 
also pointed out that the ITO would make the United States “economically 
stronger by freeing our access to other people’s products.”190 Moreover, it 
noted that the United States’ economic power “is dependent not only on ac-
cess to raw material but also on technological development, progressive 
management and an active and expanding industrial plant, to which export 
markets are essential.”191 The head U.S. negotiator, William Clayton (Assis-
tant Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) put it simply: The Ser-
vices Departments “supported the very proposition which they were intend-
ed to oppose.”192
A day before the meeting, John Leddy composed a sharp defense of the 
ITO and of trade multilateralism to William Clayton on behalf of Clair Wil-
cox, meant to summarize earlier discussion with the Services officials.193
Calling the Services Departments’ approach “shortsighted,” Leddy noted 
that there was “no clear distinction between ‘security’ industries and other 
industries, and any basic industry might be defended as essential from the 
security standpoint.”194 From a strategic perspective, the Services Depart-
ments’ approach made no sense to State—permitting discrimination on se-
curity grounds would allow for any kind of discrimination on that basis, in-
cluding British imperial preferences and the “system of ‘integration’” 
pursued by the Soviet Union in eastern Europe.195 Leddy concluded that the 
Services Departments’ exception language “would tear the heart out of the 
Charter.”196
In a June 17, 1946 meeting with the Services Departments, Wilcox and 
Clayton spoke to Services’ questions about the TAC proposal “at some 
length” and emphasized the potential of the ITO to improve living stand-
189. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 115, at 5; see supra text ac-
companying note 180.
190. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, June 14, 1946, supra note 115, at 5.
191. Id. at 4–5.
192. Id. at 6.
193. See Wilcox Draft Letter to Clayton, supra note 134.
194. Id. at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 3.
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ards, advance technology, and bring peace and national security.197 They 
placed the ITO as part of a bigger picture of economic recovery and integra-
tion, alongside loans to Britain and France, and the operation of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, created in 1944.198 The DOS believed that “the Charter 
as written, with the safeguards it contains against action by other nations in-
imical to United States interests, is a better protection for our security than 
the reservations proposed by the Services.”199 For the DOS, the outcome of 
unity and interdependence superseded the exclusion of certain security con-
cerns in the architecture of the ITO.200
Though the Services Departments acknowledged the DOS’s arguments, 
they reportedly continued “to plead for a free hand in controlling interna-
tional transactions for military purposes.”201 They demanded freedom “to 
stop any shipment of any raw material, scrap, manufactured product, plant 
equipment, or technology to Russia at any time without regard to whether or 
not there was imminent threat of war.”202 Although the Services Depart-
ments mentioned their intention to escalate their concerns to the Joint Chief 
of Staffs, Wilcox stood firm. Though the DOS sought to make “necessary” 
provisions for security, “he insisted that this must be done in a way that 
would not give a carte blanche to other countries to violate their commit-
ments with respect to commercial policy under the cloak of a sweeping se-
curity exception.”203 At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that 
Neff and Wilcox would work together to develop wording for the Charter 
exceptions.204
197. U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Security Exceptions to Pro-
posed ITO Charter, at 2 (June 17, 1946) [hereinafter Memorandum of Conversation, Security 
Exceptions, June 17, 1946] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 13, A1 698, file ‘Char-
ter: Security’).
198. Id.
199. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 2.
200. Unauthored and Undated ECEFP Memorandum, supra note 164, at 3 (giving the 
State Department’s response to the Services Departments’ reliance on the Anglo-American 
Petroleum Agreement as a past practice justifying broad security exceptions). The memoran-
dum reported that the U.S. position at the time of that agreement “was that such pre-emptive 
rights [to oil in time of war or emergency] should be exercised only in the light of the broad 
(commercial) objectives of the Agreement and that any new agreements regarding such rights 
should be subject to international review.” Id. Nevertheless, the memorandum urged that the 
text of the agreement was “subject always to considerations of military security and to the 
provisions of such arrangements for the preservation of peace and prevention of aggression as 
may be in force.” Id. (emphasis in original).
201. Memorandum of Conversation, Security Exceptions, June 17, 1946, supra note 
197, at 2.
202. Id. at 1–2. The language “imminent threat of war” was seen by the Army-Navy 
Munitions Board representative, Mr. Deupree, as having “serious diplomatic repercussions,”
and he “urged a change in the wording.” Id.
203. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
204. Id.
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In early July 1946, Clair Wilcox wrote to William Clayton and Dean 
Acheson and argued that the Services Departments sought a Charter provi-
sion “so broad as to permit any nation, seeking individual advantage in trade 
under the guise of security, completely to escape from the obligations it had 
assumed under the ITO Charter.”205 Wilcox cautioned that the Services De-
partments sought “a loophole for everything except consumers’ luxury 
goods.”206
Taking on the voice of economic authority in his memorandum, Wilcox 
went on to explain that U.S. military potential needed export markets, espe-
cially to develop “large-scale, heavy manufacturing.”207 Moreover, Wilcox 
argued that the Services Departments had failed to consider how other gov-
ernments would invoke such broad security exceptions. He raised caution 
that, under a broadly worded security exception provision, other countries 
producing the strategic raw materials required by the United States would 
be free to impose discriminatory trade barriers or “close those markets to 
us.”208 He worried that the Services Departments’ exception clause sought to 
“build our military strength . . . not by methods that would integrate the oth-
er economies of the world more closely with our own, but by methods that 
would isolate them from us.”209 He closed his letter by noting that the Ser-
vices Departments and “civilian departments” fundamentally disagreed on 
whether to include an exception provision “so broad as to leave every 
Member free to engage in economic warfare and, by unilateral actions, to 
impose economic sanctions in times of peace.”210
The DOS presented the redrafted security exceptions (in article 32 of 
the draft Suggested Charter) on July 17, 1946.211 To address the Services 
Departments’ concern with the narrowness of permitted actions relating to 
“arms, ammunition, implements of war and fissionable materials,” the DOS 
proposed appending “[and] other supplies of the use of the military estab-
lishment.”212 The DOS also proposed the phrase “international emergency” 
in place of the phrase “imminent threat of war.” This change stemmed from 
Services’ belief that the original wording would be “unduly restrictive be-





210. Id. at 4. Though he sought guidance from Acheson and Clayton, the archive file did 
not contain their response on this issue.
211. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Security Exceptions in the ITO Draft Charter–
Memorandum from the Department of State, Memorandum, ECEFP D-64/46 (July 17, 1946) 
[hereinafter ECEFP, Security Exceptions Memorandum] (on file with NACP, record group 
59, box 50, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Meeting Documents 61/46-70/46’).
212. Id. at 1.
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cause action taken under this exception [provision] would involve formal 
public admission that war threatened.”213
Two days later, on July 19th, the ECEFP approved all of these textual 
changes to the general exceptions provision of the commercial policy chap-
ter, article 32.214 First, it agreed to the creation of a new paragraph that ad-
dressed measures “relating to fissionable materials” since this was consid-
ered a separate class of materials from the class of “arms, ammunition and 
implements of war.”215 Second, it broadened sub-paragraph (d) to exempt 
from the Charter’s commercial policy commitments “such traffic in other 
goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment.”216 Wilcox observed that under this wording “only that por-
tion (meaning specific shipments of specific goods) of such traffic conduct-
ed with the end purpose of actually supplying the military[,] whether going 
directly to the military or to private hands[,] could be dealt with by excep-
tional measures.”217 The example provided in the meeting by DOS officials 
was control over pre-war traffic in scrap metal destined for Japanese mili-
tary use.218 Neff required time to study Wilcox’s proposal, but offered a ten-
tative acceptance of the language.219
Third, the ECEFP approved the change to subparagraph (e). The phrase 
“international emergency” was substituted for “imminent threat of war” so 
as “to avoid the possibility that action under these provisions would appear 
to be practically an act of war.”220 The ECEFP then agreed to further amend 
“international emergency” to “emergency in international relations,” as sug-
gested by Lynn R. Edminster, Vice Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion,  “to avoid the implication that Members would be free to take 
measures under article 32 in an economic emergency, such as a world de-
pression.”221
213. Id.
214. The group further agreed to amend article 49, dealing with exceptions to provisions 
relating to intergovernmental commodity agreements, to match the changes made to article 32. 
U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP M-23/46, at 7 (July 19, 1946) [herein-
after ECEFP Meeting Minutes, July 19, 1946] (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 57, 
A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Minutes 16/46-33/46’).
215. Id. at 6.
216. The ECEFP further approved an amendment to article 32(d), subject to study by the 
War Department: “relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war [and 
fissionable materials] and to such traffic in other goods and material as is carried on for the 
purpose of applying a military establishment.” Id. at 2 (bracketed text in original document 
signified alternative language, underlining signified new additions to the draft).
217. Id. at 6–7.
218. Id. at 7.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2, 7.
221. Id. at 7. The ECEFP thus approved a change to article 32(e), “in time of war or 
[imminent threat of war] emergency in international relations, relating to the protection of the 
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E.  Amendments to the Suggested Charter’s Provisions Respecting 
Interpretation and Dispute Settlement
The Services Departments’ concerns with the security exceptions also 
raised questions of enforcement. In particular, the Services Departments 
questioned whether either the ITO Executive Board or the ITO Conference 
(the full membership of ITO Members) could have the power to “stigmatize 
a country as a violator” through enforcement decisions.222 The Services De-
partments objected to either body retaining full discretion to “vote upon a 
‘decision’ in interpreting the security exceptions of the Charter [so] as to 
place [the United States] in violation of its commitments thereunder.”223 The 
Services Departments particularly objected that the parties to a dispute 
lacked the right of appeal to the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), giv-
ing the ITO’s Executive Board “final discretion.”224
On June 28, 1946, before finalizing the text of the security exceptions 
article itself that July, the ECEFP met to discuss revision of paragraph 2 of 
article 76 of the Charter draft, respecting the interpretation and settlement of 
dispute. It particularly evaluated judicial interpretation of the national secu-
rity exceptions, the issue of appeal of any ruling of the Executive Board, 
and the opportunity for Members to appeal a decision of the Conference to 
the ICJ.225 The ECEFP  debated whether the ability to refer questions of in-
terpretation outside the ITO—to the ICJ—should be an automatic right for 
ITO Members.226 Neff argued against placing “complete power” to interpret 
“national security exceptions” with the Board or Conference. However, he 
also observed that ICJ review of such exceptions raised additional ques-
tions, since the United States had not yet accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of the ICJ.227 He suggested further study of the matter, and recommend-
ed that “questions of interpretation involving national security” would fall 
under the jurisdiction of the U.N. Security Council.228
To address the alleged potential for stigmatization, the DOS revised ar-
ticle 76 in meetings from late June to early July. Rather than provide a “de-
cision,” the Executive Board or Conference would provide a “ruling,” with 
recourse to the ICJ upon consent of the Conference.229 The DOS further 
essential security interests of a Member.” (Bracketed text in original document signified alter-
native language, underlining signified new additions to the draft.)
222. ECEFP, Security Exceptions Memorandum, supra note 211, at 2.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP M-20/46, at 2 (June 28, 
1946) (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 57, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Minutes 16/46-33/
46’).
226. Id. at 6.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2–3. After this revision, article 76(2) read: 
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amended the text to comply with the ECEFP’s position that a “ruling” of the 
Executive Board regarding the interpretation of the Charter should be sub-
ject to appeal to the Conference.230 The DOS sought to assure Neff that, re-
garding the interpretation of the security exceptions by the Executive Board 
or Conference, the revised language was “intentionally inexplicit” and 
would “avoid the implication that a ‘ruling’ of the Conference would be 
necessarily binding on all Members.”231 Leddy also explained that “only 
should there be sufficient reason would Members be likely to impose, as 
provided elsewhere in the Charter, sanctions and penalties on a Member not 
abiding by a ruling of the Conference.”232
Neff raised concern that in the case of a dispute involving the security 
exceptions, the Conference could “refuse[] to allow a Member to carry a 
case to the [ICJ]” under the existing draft.233 Requiring consent had estab-
lished “in effect . . . a screening mechanism for such appeals.”234 In re-
sponse, Leddy confirmed new language providing that when a Member 
brings a dispute to the ICJ (with Conference consent) it “will in effect set up 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court over the other party to the dis-
pute.”235 Neff desired more time to consider the security implications of the 
dispute resolution procedure presented by DOS. At this preliminary junc-
ture, Neff argued it was “unnecessary and undesirable” to require Confer-
ence consent for appeals.236 He believed the U.S. Government should have 
“full power” to present a case to the ICJ whenever it so chose.237 Leddy 
challenged Neff’s assessment. He argued that “many cases involving inter-
pretation of the Charter might place an unnecessary burden on the Court and 
Any question or difference concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be [decided by] 
referred to the Executive Board for a ruling thereon. [which] The Executive Board may re-
quire a preliminary report from any of the Commissions in such cases as it deems appropriate. 
Any ruling of the Executive Board shall, upon the request of any Member directly affected or, 
if the ruling is of general application, upon the request of any Member, be referred to the Con-
ference. [A decision of the Executive Board] Any justifiable issue arising out of a ruling of the 
Conference [shall, in the discretion of the Board] may, with the consent of the Conference, be 
[referred] submitted by [the] any Party[ies] to the dispute to the International Court of Justice 
[for review]. The Members accept the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of any dispute sub-
mitted to the Court under this Article. (Bracketed text in original document signified alterna-
tive language, underlining signified new additions to the draft.)
230. U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP M-22/46, at 3 (July 12, 







236. Id. at 3–4.
237. Id. at 4.
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should be kept within the Organization, as far as possible.”238 Leddy added 
that other DOS officials found the screening mechanism for referrals to the 
ICJ to be “necessary.”239
By July 19th, the ECEFP approved changes proposed by the DOS fol-
lowing its consultation with Services. New language was added to article 
76(2) of the Charter, respecting the interpretation of the security exceptions 
and the settlement of disputes: “Any justiciable issue arising out of a ruling 
of the Conference with respect to the interpretation of subparagraphs (c), 
(d), (e) or (k) of article 32 or of Paragraph 2 of article 49 may be submitted 
by any Party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice . . . .”240 Oth-
er justiciable issues arising out of a Conference ruling could be submitted by 
the disputing parties to the ICJ only with Conference consent.241 Wilcox 
confirmed that the goal was to address the Services Departments’ concerns 
with “the authority given to the Conference in previous drafts” by offering 
appeal to the World Court.242 Leroy Stinebower (an economist with the 
DOS, and special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic 
and Business Affairs, Willard Thorp) believed the redraft would be “ac-
ceptable” to the ECEFP Committee on Specialized International Economic 
Organizations (another relevant ECEFP sub-committee, the “IO sub-
committee”), though the subcommittee had not thus far given “special con-
sideration to security questions.”243
Neff also argued that the U.S. negotiators should treat the conservation 
exception (found in subparagraph (j) of article 32)244 like other “purely” se-
curity exceptions, thereby removing its interpretation from the “absolute 
competence of the Conference.”245 A new discussion then arose as to wheth-
er or not consent of the Conference was required to appeal a justiciable is-
sue concerning the conservation exception to the ICJ, though the analysis 
offers insights into the treatment of the “purely security exceptions,” too.246
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, July 19, 1946, supra note 214, at 1–2 (bracketed text in 
original document signified alternative language, underlining signified new additions to the 
draft).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 3.
243. Id.
244. Article 32(j) of the Suggested Charter draft provided an exception to Members’
trade commitments “[r]elating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are taken pursuant to international agreements or are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, su-
pra note 63. See also the July 17, 1946 ECEFP, Security Exceptions Memorandum, supra 
note 211, for the recommended DOS text prior to ECEFP agreement, which was identical to 
the final article 32(j).
245. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, July 19, 1946, supra note 214, at 3.
246. Id.
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Stinebower stated that the IO subcommittee sought to have the ITO 
Charter interpretation provisions “parallel” those in the Monetary Fund 
Agreement.247 Permitting appeals without Conference consent for an excep-
tion “which has many security aspects but which is not specifically a securi-
ty exception” would weaken the Charter when other governments began “to 
add to these exemptions on grounds of national security.”248 He did not rec-
ommend “remov[ing] [it] from the interpretative power of the Organiza-
tion.”249 Stinebower, Oscar Ryder (Chairman of the Tariff Commission), and 
others within the ECEFP meeting argued that the conservation exemption 
was “essentially economic and political in character rather than legal” and 
required a “political interpretation and not a legal opinion.”250 As such, the 
Conference “as the representative body of the Organization” seemed to be 
“the proper authority to interpret such questions.”251 Leddy interjected that 
the ECEFP should determine the proper authority for resolving such ques-
tions after determining whether voting in the Conference was weighted or 
not.252
The discussion offered an opportunity for Neff to further clarify the 
Services Departments’ position on the jurisdiction of the ICJ to interpret se-
curity matters. Neff dismissed Stinebower’s desire to match the Charter’s 
interpretation provisions with those of the Monetary Fund because the Con-
ference was at that time designed with “one Member—one vote” representa-
tion (as compared to the Fund, where Members had weighted votes).253
Moreover, with its “wider field of operations” the ITO also placed “greater 
limitations on national power than the Fund.”254 Neff proposed striking Con-
ference screening on “all justiciable questions to the Court.”255 Wilcox be-
lieved the conservation exception was “limited” in importance, “but he felt 
that exemptions regarding appeals should be limited to strictly security mat-
ters.”256 Therefore, Wilcox saw merit in including screening by the Organi-
zation of trade matters relating to the Charter.257
The finalized article 32 of the Suggested Charter, published in Septem-
ber 1946, provided general exceptions to the commercial policy chapter, 
with several sub-paragraphs devoted to security concerns (sub-paragraphs 
(c), (d), (e) and (k)):
247. Id.
248. Id. at 3–4.
249. Id. at 3.





255. Id. at 4–5.
256. Id. at 6.
257. Id. at 6.
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Nothing in Chapter IV shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures . . . (c) relating to fission-
able materials; (d) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and 
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials 
as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military establish-
ment; (e) in time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions, relating to the protection of the essential security interests of 
a Member; . . . (k) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of inter-
national peace and security . . . .258
The Suggested Charter also contained security exceptions to the intergov-
ernmental commodity arrangements chapter in article 49(2).259
There were other relevant provisions for understanding the function of 
the security exceptions within the Suggested Charter. In line with past U.S. 
trade agreements, the Suggested Charter provided for consultation among 
ITO Members on all matters affecting the operation of its commercial poli-
cy chapter.260 Article 30 set out that any Member could initiate consultations 
with another Member regarding representations on the operation of internal 
regulation and laws, and “generally all matters affecting the operation of 
this Charter.”261 Further, Members could work towards a “mutually satisfac-
tory” solution in the event one Member believed another’s measures “ha[d] 
the effect of nullifying or impairing any object of this Chapter,” regardless 
of whether or not the measure generally conflicted with the Chapter’s com-
mitments (the nullification or impairment procedure).262 Members could re-
258. See 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63, art. 32. A brief note on the chang-
ing sub-articles. The security exceptions first appear in the U.S. Suggested Charter’s article 
32, with relevant provisions including sub-articles (c), (d), (e), and (k). Parallel provisions 
were present in article 49(2) of the U.S. Suggested Charter. The exceptions were moved to 
article 37 of the London and New York drafts of the ITO Charter, article 94 in the Geneva 
draft, and finally article 99 of the Havana draft, which is almost identical to article XXI in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See generally GATT Secretariat, Article 
XXI Note by the Secretariat, Negotiating Group on GATT Articles, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/
NG7/W/16 (Aug. 18, 1987) [hereinafter GATT Secretariat Note, Aug. 18, 1987].
259. Article 49’s provisions were similarly worded to article 32’s, though article 49(2) 
lacked reference to article 32(k) of the Suggested Charter. 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra
note 63, art. 32.
260. 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63, art. 30. Article XII of the 1941 U.S.-
Argentina reciprocal trade agreement required consultations and provided the nullification or 
impairment procedure, “with a view to effecting a mutually satisfactory adjustment” of any 
disputes arising from measures imposed by other government that have the “effect of nullify-
ing or impairing any object of the Agreement or of prejudicing an industry or the commerce of 
that country, . . . .” U.S.-Arg. Agreement, Oct. 14, 1941, supra note 99. 
261. 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63, art. 30.
262. Id. In “non-violation” complaints, the emphasis is not on compliance with the Char-
ter but on whether a Member frustrated one of its objectives. Non-violation complaints seek to 
redress an imbalance created when one Member frustrates another Member’s benefit by taking 
a measure otherwise consistent with the Charter. This issue is addressed in Part VIII and in the 
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fer disputes to the Organization, and it would investigate, “make appropriate 
recommendations,” and where “serious enough,” would “determine” when a 
complainant Member could suspend obligations or concessions to the other 
Member.263
In sum, the United States’ internal preparation of the security excep-
tions revealed a number of insights. First, intense debate among DOS and 
Services displayed the Services Departments’ desire to weaken the authority 
of the ITO to preserve U.S. industrial post-war powers. While the DOS 
sought to curb unilateralism, the Services Departments wanted to preserve 
open-ended powers for the United States. Second, compromise was found 
by introducing (or, in some cases, restoring) indeterminate and open-ended 
language, such as the reference to an “emergency” as an enumerated cir-
cumstance within the security exception provision. Third, the nullification 
or impairment procedure was considered to be a check on abuse of the ex-
ceptions. Fourth, the exceptions were seen as justiciable, but there remained 
debate as to which body would undertake review of trade matters involving 
national security concerns—an organ of the ITO or the ICJ.
IV.  London and New York: Prohibiting Arbitrary 
Discrimination and Generalizing the Security Exceptions
A few months after the DOS published the Suggested Charter, national 
delegations met in London for the first preparatory meetings.264 In London 
in November 1946, the United Kingdom’s delegation raised concern with 
the potential for Member “abuse” of article 32 of the Suggested Charter (the 
general exceptions to the commercial policy chapter) to mask economic pro-
tection.265 The solution proposed by the United Kingdom was to add intro-
ductory language to the exception provision: Measures relating to import 
and export restrictions could not be prevented “provided they are not ap-
plied in such a manner as to constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
conclusion of this article. For information regarding the origins of the non-violation com-
plaint, see Mona Pinchis, The Ancestry of ‘Equitable Treatment’ in Trade: Lessons from the 
League of Nations During the Inter-War Period, 15 J WORLD INV. & TRADE 13–72 (2014) 
and the citations therein.
263. 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63, art. 30.
264. The Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Em-
ployment was formed to complete the ITO’s Charter. Its work was divided into three phases. 
There were two preparatory committee sessions, in London (1946) and in Geneva (1947), and 
a meeting of the Drafting Committee in New York (1947). The United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment was then held in Havana, Cuba in 1948.
265. See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n II, Ninth Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/
C.II/50, at 7 (Nov. 13, 1946) [hereinafter U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n II, Technical 
Sub-Committee, Ninth Meeting Notes, Nov. 13 1946].
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between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade.”266
Leddy defended the existing text, observing that any added language to 
the general exceptions article was unnecessary. He explained that article 30 
was already designed to prevent “evasion of the provisions” of the commer-
cial policy chapter.267 (As written, article 30 required that all disputing ITO 
members engage in consultations regarding the “nullification and impair-
ment of any object of the Charter.”268) If an ITO member opportunistically 
used an exception “as a means of [trade] protection” then the nullification or 
impairment procedure “provided that another Member might make repre-
sentations to the ITO and so obtain satisfaction.”269
Leddy added that it was “impossible to draft exceptions which could 
not be abused, if good faith was lacking.”270 He observed that the League of 
Nations committees had constructed the basis of the text that became article 
30 “precisely because they had been unable to formulate exceptions which 
would exclude all possibility of abuse.”271 Nevertheless, there was wide 
support for the proposal, with Leddy ultimately suggesting acceptance “in 
principle” pending “further study of the wording.”272
After London, the New York Drafting Committee included the UK’s 
proposal in its revised general exceptions provision (now article 37 instead 
of article 32).273 To prevent the language from blocking justifiably discrimi-
natory measures, the chapeau of the exceptions was modified to cover “arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination.”274
266. Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions to Chapter 
V, ECEFP D-55/47, at 3 (Mar. 31, 1947) [hereinafter ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions 
to Chapter V, 1947] (on file with NACP, record group 59, box 51, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Meet-
ing Documents 46/47-60/47’).
267. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n II, Technical Sub-Committee, Ninth Meet-
ing Notes, Nov. 13, 1946, at 6.
268. 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63, art. 30.
269. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n II, Technical Sub-Committee, Ninth Meet-
ing Notes, Nov. 13, 1946, supra note 265, at 6.
270. Id.
271. Id. Leddy is referring to interwar multilateral conferences convened by the League 
of Nations, where national delegations had first attempted to address these trade issues. See
generally Pinchis, supra note 262, at 13–72.
272. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n II, Technical Sub-Committee, Ninth Meet-
ing Notes, Nov. 13, 1946, at 9. At the time, Leddy was the Rapporteur of the Procedures Sub-
Committee.
273. ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions to Chapter V, 1947, supra note 266, at 3.
274. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). The full chapeau of article 37 read: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between coun-
tries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in Chapter V shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any Member of measures: . . . .
150 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:109
While the scope of the ICJ’s review was broadened in the first prepara-
tory meeting in London with amendments to sub-articles 86(2) and (3) (pre-
viously article 76), Seymour Rubin, a lawyer on the U.S. negotiators’ team, 
later explained in scholarship that the absolute right to appeal interpretation 
of the security articles remained unchanged.275 Moreover, the London draft 
“eliminated as a Charter requirement the necessity for Conference approval 
before an appeal could be lodged with the Court.”276
In Washington, reviewing the work of the drafting committee, the 
ECEFP now faced two issues in its recommendations for the U.S. negotia-
tors moving forward. First, was the issue of generalizing the “essential” se-
curity-related exceptions in article 37 to apply to the entire Charter.277 At the 
DOS’s recommendation, the ECEFP agreed to this.278 Interestingly, several 
chapters already contained their own chapter-specific exceptions, but specif-
ic notice was placed on the demand for security exceptions that would cover 
the investment commitments (then article 12 of the draft).279 To prevent sig-
nificant abuse of a single, generalized Charter exceptions provision, DOS 
recommended “circumscribing the exceptions to fit the particular matters” 
where needed.280
Second, there was the issue of whether the newly-approved chapeau of 
the commercial policy chapter’s general exceptions provision (article 37) 
would apply to the proposed replacement provision, containing the Char-
ter’s consolidated, generalized security-related exceptions.281 The ECEFP 
was cognizant that any dramatic changes would be difficult, considering 
other delegations’ insistence on the chapeau.282 Nonetheless, the ECEFP 
See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, Report of the Drafting Committee of the 
Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment (20 January to 25 
February 1947), GATT Doc. E/PC/T/34, at 32 (Mar. 5, 1947) [hereinafter Report of the Draft-
ing Committee—New York Draft Charter and Draft GATT].
275. Seymour J. Rubin, The Judicial Review Problem in the International Trade Organ-
ization, 63 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81, 82 (1949).
276. Id.
277. Accepted security exceptions in article 37 are those: (c) relating to fissionable ma-
terials; (d) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traf-
fic in other goods and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military estab-
lishment; (e) undertaken in time of war or other emergency in international relations, relating 
to the protection of the essential security interests of a Member; and (k) undertaken in pursu-
ance of obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace and security. Report of the Drafting Committee—New York Draft Charter 
and Draft GATT, supra note 274.
278. ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions to Chapter V, 1947, supra note 266, at 7; 
see also ECEFP Meeting Minutes, Apr. 3, 1947, supra note 285, at 3.
279. Id. at 7–8. The commercial policy, restrictive business practice, and intergovern-
mental commodity arrangements (Chapters V, VI, and VII of the New York Draft, respective-
ly) were adequately covered by exceptions.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1.
282. Id. at 2, 7.
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found the New York Draft Charter’s chapeau to the general exceptions to be 
ineffective as the language was “vague and diffuse, making it difficult, if 
not impossible, to assign specific content to it.”283 Moreover, the broadness 
of the language could “preclude the possible application of the exceptions to 
meet the legitimate circumstances for which the exceptions were de-
signed.”284 Security exceptions, ECEFP officials particularly noted, were of-
ten “specifically intended to be discriminatory in character” and thus in con-
flict with the chapeau.285
For the text of the Charter’s generalized security-related exceptions, the 
ECEFP considered three DOS options for the U.S. negotiators. According to 
the ECEFP, its first and “best” option was to revert back to the introductory 
language of article 32 of the Suggested Charter, and to include “express ref-
erence to possible recourse, in the event of abuse of the exceptions, to the 
nullification or impairment procedure of article 35 of the Charter.”286 Ex-
plicit reference to article 35 would offer members assurances against abuse 
by “advis[ing] Members contemplating abuse of the exceptions of the pos-
sible consequences.”287 The nullification or impairment procedure would 
“prevent any object of the Charter [from] being frustrated,” and explicit ref-
erence to it would “avoid[] any possible unintended limitation that the [se-
curity exceptions] clause might now convey.”288
The second option was for the U.S. negotiators to seek modification of 
the phrase “or a disguised restriction on international trade” within the cha-
peau of the New York Draft Charter’s security exceptions provision, to 
more clearly explain “that the exceptions should not be used to disguise pro-
tectionist measures or to maintain other restrictive measures contrary to the 
objectives of the Charter.”289
A third option was to bifurcate the security-related exceptions into qual-
ified and un-qualified categories, as in article XV of the 1941 reciprocal 
trade agreement between the United States and Argentina.290 The DOS con-
sidered this proposal to be “unnecessary and inadvisable” if the other dele-
gations accepted the first two options.291 ECEFP officials agreed with the 
283. Id. at 1.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1; U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Meeting Minutes, ECEFP Doc. M-11/47, at 
1–2 (April 3, 1947) [hereinafter ECEFP Meeting Minutes, Apr. 3, 1947] (on file with NACP, 
record group 59, box 57, A1 353, file ‘ECEFP Minutes 1/47-20.47’).
286. Id. at 2, 6. The chapeau of article 32 of the U.S. Suggested Charter read: “Nothing 
in Chapter V of this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
Member of measures.” 1946 U.S. Suggested Charter, supra note 63.
287. Id. at 6.
288. Id.
289. ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions to Chapter V, 1947, supra note 266, at 6.
290. ECEFP Meeting Minutes, Apr. 3, 1947, supra note 285, at 2; see supra text accom-
panying notes 98–102. 
291. ECEFP, Article 37–General Exceptions to Chapter V, 1947, supra note 266, at 6.
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DOS assessment that it would be “difficult[]” to determine which group 
each exception fell into.292 The bifurcation was not taken up in New York as 
it implied “a greater restriction on the possible application of the exceptions 
in the qualified group than if these exceptions were all placed together under 
a single uniform qualification.”293
V.  Geneva: The Dawn of the Cold War and the Construction 
of a Generalized Charter Security Provision
In Geneva, the U.S. negotiators debated the interpretation of the securi-
ty exceptions while working with other delegations to construct a general 
article that would apply to the entire Charter. Concerns with U.S. security 
were rising, with Services officials (Captain Wakeman Thorp of the U.S. 
Navy joined Neff in representing the Services Departments) observing that 
“the general situation in the world has changed drastically in the last few 
months,” seeing “Eastern European policy” as a key example.294 Nonethe-
less, Wilcox championed the “careful” consideration  of the ITO “over 5 
years,” and contested any changes that would make the security exceptions 
“unquestionably . . . a means of evading [trade] responsibilities.”295
A. Security Exceptions Applicable to the Entire Charter
In June 1947, the U.S. delegation proposed relocating the security ex-
ceptions of article 37 into a newly composed chapter meant to apply to the 
entire Charter.296 Internally, DOS lawyer Edmund Halsey Kellogg drafted 
the new security exceptions and authored a memorandum setting out the 
scope of the new “Miscellaneous” chapter, which he finished in early Ju-
ly.297 The Miscellaneous chapter consolidated the following New York 
292. Id. at 5.
293. Id.
294. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Minutes of Delegation, TAC, and Charter Working Group 
Meeting for the Second Meeting of the U.N. Preparatory Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade 
and Employment, ECEFP A1-704, at 2 (May 30, 1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, 
box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/April–June 20, 1947’).
295. Id.
296. U.S. Dep’t of State, Minutes of General Staff Meeting, ECEFP A1-704 (June 4, 
1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/
April–June 20, 1947’); Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conf. on Trade and Emp., Work-
ing Party on Technical Articles On Its Second Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/103, at 43 (June 
19, 1947) (verifying that the Working Party, a group composed of different national delega-
tions in Geneva, had received the U.S. delegation’s proposal, but had considered it “beyond its 
terms of reference,” though it agreed to present the proposal to a higher-level committee for 
review). For the text of these relocated sub-paragraphs, see text accompanying note 277.
297. Id.; see U.S. Delegation to U.N. Secretariat, Second Meeting of the U.S. Preparato-
ry Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade and Employment, Meeting Minutes, at 6 (July 2, 1947). 
[hereinafter Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, 
A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/June 21–July 30, 1947’); U.S. Dep’t of State, Edmund 
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Charter draft provisions: generalized security exceptions (replacing articles 
37, sub-paragraphs c, d, e, and k; 59(c); and 42(2)(c)(i));298 consultation for 
nullification or impairment (article 35(2)); and, dispute settlement and inter-
pretation (article 86).299 It also included some new provisions, including a 
sunset clause mandating review of the Charter after ten years.300 Kellogg’s 
draft security exceptions (a new article 94) read as follows:
1. Nothing in this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any Member of any measure which it 
may deem necessary:
a) relating to fissionable materials;
b) relating to traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of 
war, and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on for the purpose of supplying a military estab-
lishment [and to such traffic in other goods and materials 
as is carried on for the direct or indirect use of a military 
establishment], [if such measure is adopted or enforced 
unilaterally];
c) in time of war or other emergency in international relations 
[which has been officially declared by the Member con-
cerned], relating to the protection of its essential security 
interests;
d) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of in-
ternational peace and security.
Halsey Kellogg Biographic Data, attached to Office Memorandum from L.D. Heck to Mr. 
Swayzee (May 5, 1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 132, A1 704, file ‘Biog-
raphies 2’).
298. See Report of the Drafting Committee—New York Draft Charter and Draft GATT,
supra note 274, at 31, 36–37, 44.
299. See Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297, at 4–5 (containing an outline 
of Kellogg’s proposed article 94); cf. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, Preparatory 
Comm. of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Second Sess., Draft Charter, 
GATT Doc. E/PC/T/W/236, at 8, 10, 12 (July 4, 1947) (containing the U.S. proposal as sub-
mitted to other delegations); U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, Preparatory Comm. of 
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Second Sess., Corrigendum, GATT Doc. E/
PC/T/W/236/Corr.1 (July 5, 1947) [hereinafter Proposals for the Amendment of Chapters I 
and II] (confirming the list of all articles moved to the new Miscellaneous Chapter), U.N. 
Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, Preparatory Comm. of the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
Employment, Second Sess., Corrigendum 2, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/W/236/Corr.2 (July 7, 
1947), at 13 (correcting Corrigendum 1). Collectively, E/PC/T/W/236 and its two corrigenda 
are hereinafter referred to as the “U.S. Miscellaneous Chapter Proposal, July 4, 1947.”
300. Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297.
154 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:109
2. This article shall not be interpreted as limiting the generality of 
other provisions of this Charter.301
As you can see, Kellogg’s draft differed from both the Suggested Char-
ter and the New York Charter draft. Unlike the Suggested Charter, Kel-
logg’s draft included the phrase “which it may deem necessary” (in article 
94(1)) which sought to clarify that each ITO Member could determine 
whether its measures were “necessary.”302 Whether this adjectival clause 
served as part of the article’s introductory language  (disconnected from the 
terms “relating to” in article 94(1)(a), (b) and (c) or the “protection of its es-
sential security interests” in article 94(1)(c)) is addressed below.303 Kellogg 
did not provide a rationale for his inclusion of the word “may” preceding 
the adjectival clause.304 Unlike the New York draft, Kellogg’s draft lacked a 
prohibition against “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”
B.  Services’ Efforts to Expand the Scope of the Security Exceptions
As demonstrated by internal ECEFP discussions in 1944, Neff sought to 
maximize the U.S. government’s power to take measures in the name of na-
tional security, broadly defined. When working with DOS officials in 1947 
in Geneva, Neff sought greater specificity in the security exceptions’ lan-
guage, treating this as a remedy for vagueness.305 For example, Neff pro-
posed amending Kellogg’s security exceptions to add the words “directly or 
indirectly” after the words “carried on” in article 94, paragraph 1(b).306
Neff’s justification was that this language brought the exceptions into con-
formity with proposed U.S. legislation (the proposed Munitions Control 
301. Id. annex C, article 94 (General Exceptions, attached memorandum) (brackets in 
original, signifying edits on the U.S. delegation side); see also Proposals for the Amendment 
of Chapters I and II, supra note 299.
302. Thanks to Harlan Cohen for pointing out that this was slightly different than the 
contemporary “it considers necessary” language in article XXI GATT. Simon Lester has high-
lighted the importance of the word “considers” in the phrasing of the national security excep-
tions. See Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI: The U.S. View of the 
Scope of the Security Exception, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 11, 2018, 8:34 AM), 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/draft-of-gatt-security-exception-
considers.html; Simon Lester, The Drafting History of GATT Article XXI: Where Did “Con-
siders” Come From?, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 13, 2018, 9:36 AM) 
https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/drafting-history-of-gatt-article-xxi.html. 
For a discussion by Neff drawing attention to the word “considers,” see infra note 378. 
303. See infra text accompanying note 554.
304. For a possible source of the inclusion of “may,” note that past U.S. trade agree-
ments included the word “may.” See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 102. See also infra
text accompanying notes 476–477 (further elaborating on the purpose of this term).
305. Jeremy Waldron has observed: “[I]t is a mistake to think that vagueness varies in-
versely with specificity: the opposite of ‘specific’ is ‘general’, and there is no assurance that a 
reduction in generality corresponds to a reduction in vagueness.” Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness 
in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 522 (1994).
306. Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297, at 5.
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Act307) and gave “the United States Government the widest possible latitude 
in dealing with national security objectives.”308 The proposed Munitions 
Control Act was designed to permit, in peacetime, “control over traffic in 
arms or other articles used to supply, directly or indirectly, a foreign mili-
tary establishment, and in times of international crisis to permit control over 
any article the export of which would affect the security interests of the 
United States.”309 It came in the context of rising U.S. domestic concerns 
that the U.S. government must control trade to bar any adverse effects upon 
U.S. military power, or worse, any strengthening of Soviet military poten-
tial.310
In a meeting of the U.S. delegation held on July 2, 1947, Neff’s pro-
posal to add the words “directly or indirectly” to Kellogg’s draft article elic-
ited “sharp discussion” among the U.S. negotiators.311 Leddy, John Evans 
(an economist with the Department of Commerce), and lawyers Seymour 
Rubin (Assistant Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs and legal advisor for 
the U.S. delegation) and George Bronz (Special Assistant to the General 
Counsel, Treasury) argued against Neff’s proposal. Evans argued that the 
proposal was “unnecessary” and that the existing Kellogg draft offered the 
United States “ample latitude to meet any contingency that might arise.”312
Moreover, Evans remarked that Neff’s proposal would “certainly provoke a 
great deal of argument” within the sub-committee and Commission review-
ing the security exceptions, thereby “delaying final completion of the work 
of the Charter.”313 Leddy, Rubin, and Bronz argued “with equal fervor” that 
even Neff’s added language failed to amplify protection for U.S. security 
interests against “every possible contingency which might at any time 
307. See HARRY S. TRUMAN, U.S. PRESIDENT, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION TO CONTROL THE 
EXPORTATION OF ARMS, AMMUNITION, AND IMPLEMENTS OF WAR, AND RELATED ITEMS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. Doc. No. 80–195 (1947) (including draft bill) [hereinafter 
PROPOSED MUNITIONS CONTROL ACT].
308. Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297, at 5. Neff referred to House doc-
ument 195 of the eightieth Congress, the Proposed Munitions Control Act, which was intend-
ed to authorize controls over exports of military-related goods and technology. See id. (citing
PROPOSED MUNITIONS CONTROL ACT); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1953, 
vol. IV, Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Paper Prepared by the 
Policy Planning Staff), Doc. 325, 489, 490–92 (1974) [hereinafter Kennan Policy Planning 
Paper] (detailing a policy plan by George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, to 
further restrict the trade of materials and goods with military significance out of concerns of 
strengthening Soviet economic-military power).
309. PROPOSED MUNITIONS CONTROL ACT, supra note 308, at 2 (transmitting President 
Truman’s proposal for legislation to control the exportation and importation of arms, ammuni-
tion, and implements of war).
310. Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297, at 5; see Kennan Policy Planning 
Paper, supra note 308, at 491–492.
311. Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297, at 5.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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arise.”314 Instead, Wilcox remarked, Neff’s proposal was “equally destruc-
tive of the purposes of the Charter as the amendments proposed by some 
countries designed to eliminate the ITO control over the use of quantitative 
restrictions provided for in the Charter.”315 As was typical in deciding on is-
sues that arose within their meetings, the U.S. negotiators put the proposal 
to a vote. The vote was “unanimous against” Neff’s proposal, including 
Captain Thorp, who attended the meeting representing the Navy Depart-
ment.316
That same day, after his amendment to Kellogg’s draft failed, Neff 
submitted his own draft of article 94 to U.S. negotiators:
1. Without limiting the generality of any other exception or quali-
fication, none of the obligations of this Charter shall apply to 
any measure or agreement:
a) Relating to fissionable materials or their source materials;
b) Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of supply-
ing a military establishment;
c) In time of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions, relating to the protection of its [essential] security in-
terests;
d) Undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United 
Nations Charter for the maintenance or restoration of in-
ternational peace and security.
2. Notwithstanding any provision of the Charter, no Member shall 
have to furnish any information in any report required by, or 
pursuant to, the Charter the furnishing of which will be contra-
ry to its national security.
3. The provisions of Article 86 relating to the interpretation and 
settlement of disputes shall not apply to paragraphs 1 and 2 of 





317. Harold H. Neff, Draft of Chapter IX, Article 94: General Exception to the Whole 
Charter, attached to Delegation Minutes, July 2, 1947, supra note 297 (brackets and underlin-
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Neff’s draft initiated “considerable discussion” among the U.S. negotia-
tors.318 Honore Marcel [Marc] Catudal (Legal Advisor to the DOS’s com-
mercial policy division) observed that Neff’s article 94(1) was “unneces-
sary” and “added absolutely nothing” to Kellogg’s provision, under which 
Catudal believed “[e]very possible contingency involving the national secu-
rity of the United States is covered.”319 A group of delegates composed of 
Brown, Leddy, Evans, Bronz, and Rubin agreed with Catudal.320
Wilcox, Evans, Leddy, and Bronz further argued “with great fervor” 
that article 94(2), which provided a “general exemption from supplying in-
formation touching upon national security,” was “unnecessary.”321 Once 
again, they held firm that Kellogg’s version, expressing the DOS position, 
captured “every contingency sought.”322 Wilcox further argued that, under 
the Kellogg draft, “the United States may at any time it may wish refuse to 
furnish any country information which has a bearing on [United States] na-
tional security.”323 Neff commented that there were other Charter provisions 
that were “equally unnecessary and should therefore be eliminated” under 
this logic.324 To this, Wilcox asked Terrill, Hawkins, and Rubin to assess 
similar provisions to “decide whether they can be eliminated.”325
Due to the “legal importance” of the language and phrasing of article 
94(1), Wilcox asked Rubin to closely evaluate Neff’s draft and report on his 
assessment in a memorandum. The questions posed by Wilcox required Ru-
bin to further consider if and how Neff’s language offered the United States 
stronger protection of its security interests than Kellogg’s. Of the four ques-
tions Wilcox posed to Rubin, none referred to the power of interpretation or 
to Neff’s exclusion of the provision on dispute settlement (Neff’s draft arti-
cle 94(3)).326 In fact, there was no recorded discussion of article 94(3) on 
this day.327 Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of ITO adjudicating bodies and the 
question of unilateral power of interpretation formed core parts of Rubin’s 
memorandum to Wilcox and the DOS, explored in Part V.D.
ing in original; brackets signify possible omissions and underlining new additions, all on 
Neff’s part) [hereinafter Neff Draft].








326. Id. Wilcox asked: (1) Does the clause “[w]ithout limiting . . . qualification” in arti-
cle 94(1) enhance the protection of “vital [U.S.] national security interests”? (2) Is it necessary 
to mention the word “agreement” in article 94(1)? (3) Does specifying “directly or indirectly”
in article 94(1)(b) provide interpretive value? (4) Do we need to eliminate the word “essen-
tial” from the phrase “essential security interests” to give the “fullest protection to our national 
security interests”? Id.
327. See id.
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Discussion on the security exceptions would continue at the July 4, 
1947 meeting of U.S. negotiators, but only after Wilcox announced that “he 
was becoming increasingly apprehensive concerning the possible attitude of 
the USSR with respect to the World Trade Conference and adoption of the 
ITO Charter.”328 In the early years of the construction of the ITO, U.S. offi-
cials appeared hopeful to work with the Soviet Union.329 Historian Robert A. 
Pollard described the DOS approach as “a policy of firm, but not unfriendly,
pressure on Moscow early 1946.”330 During this period, the DOS attempted 
a loan to Russia (though by April 1947 this effort was ceased formally) and 
continued trade talks, particularly regarding the Soviet Union membership 
in the ITO.331 Yet, by the start of the Geneva meetings, the two powers were 
in “almost irrevocable deadlock.”332
The U.S. delegation saw the ITO as vital for “expanding the area in 
which free enterprise [could] flourish and strengthening the hands of all na-
tions that believe in it rather than in the Soviet system.”333 Consequently, 
Wilcox was concerned that the “serious rift” between the United States and 
less-developed states regarding the use of quantitative restrictions “plays 
directly into the hands of the USSR political propagandists.”334 Wilcox was 
particularly sensitive to impressions that the ITO was “part of the conspira-
cy developed by the great powers to interfere with the internal affairs of 
small states, to dominate them economically and thus hold them in perpetual 
slavery.”335 More than ever, he felt that trade multilateralism was at stake 
328. U.S. Delegation to U.N. Secretariat, Second Meeting of the U.S. Preparatory 
Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade and Employment, Meeting Minutes, at 1 (July 4, 1947) 
[hereinafter Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, 
A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/June 21–July 30, 1947’).
329. See Telegram from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Ambassador of the 
Soviet Union Averell Harriman (Dec. 12, 1945), reprinted in 2 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
MATTERS: INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT 1328, 1348–49 (1967) (offering the Soviet Un-
ion most-favored-nation treatment and seeking non-discriminatory treatment against com-
merce of other countries). For the reference to “hope” from Clayton in 1947, see Richard 
Toye, Developing Multilateralism: The Havana Charter and the Fight for the International 
Trade Organization, 1947-1948, 25 INT’L HIST. REV. 282, 293–294, 296 (2003). But see For-
eign Relations of the United States, 1945-1953, vol. II, Harry S. Truman, 1945 (General: Po-
litical and Economic Matters, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secre-
tary of State), Doc. 678, 1328, 1350 (1967) (replying to Acheson that seeking to have the 
Soviet Union refrain from discrimination and make purchases and sales based on commercial 
considerations was “unrealistic”). 
330. POLLARD, supra note 76, at 50–52. For example, a key instrument of U.S. policy at 
the time was the Russian loan, though with Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, the loan was 
refused and remained “an economic lever for bargaining purposes” until 1947.
331. Id. at 52; ZEILER, supra note 76, at 61–62.
332. POLLARD, supra note 76, at 53; see supra Part III.C.
333. Wilcox Letter to Clayton, supra note 132, at 6.
334. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 1.
335. Id.
Spring 2020] Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security 159
and that the U.S. delegation needed to “obtain the widest possible support 
here at Geneva.”336 By mid-July 1947, Wilcox had reportedly abandoned 
hope that the Soviet Union would participate in the ITO.337
C.  Services’ Demands for Unilateral Interpretation of the Security 
Exceptions
After the last heated meeting, the U.S. negotiators met again on July 4, 
1947 to consider a new draft of the security exceptions article, as authored 
by Rubin, following further discussions as between Rubin and Neff.338 The 
draft stated, as follows:
[Without limitation of any other exception or qualification] Nothing 
in this Charter shall be construed to compell [sic] any Member to 
furnish any information the furnishing of which it considers contra-
ry to its essential security interests, or to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any Member of any measure or agreement which it 
may [deem] consider to be necessary and to relate to:
a) [Relating to] Fissionable materials or their source materials;
b) [Relating to] The traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is car-
ried on for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
c) In time of war or other emergency in international relations, 
[relating to] the protection of its essential security interests;
d) [Undertaken] Undertakings in pursuant of obligations under the 
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.339
A key question about the scope of unilateral powers for interpretation of 
the security exceptions was whether to use the phrase “and to relate to” in 
the chapeau of the security exception provision, or to tether the enumerated 
336. Id., at 2.
337. ZEILER, supra note 76, at 136.
338. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 1–2. U.S. negotiators chal-
lenged Neff on a variety of elements of his draft security exceptions. For example, Neff pro-
posed to limit the Charter’s application with regard to “measures or agreement” rather simply 
referring to “measures”; Leddy, Terrill, and Rubin argued that the term “measure” was broad 
enough. Id.
339. Seymour Rubin, Chapter IX: Article General Exceptions, attached to Delegation 
Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328 [hereinafter Rubin Draft] (brackets indicate possible 
changes and underlining refers to possible additions, as between Neff’s Draft and Rubin’s
Draft). See generally Neff Draft, supra note 317 (presenting Neff’s original proposal prior to 
compromises made between Rubin and Neff).
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actions to the chapeau with the term “relating to.”340 Wilcox proposed a
change to “relating to,” however the placement of these words was left un-
clear in the minutes of the July 4th meeting.341 Rubin explained to the U.S. 
negotiators that his draft included the phrase “and to relate to” within the 
chapeau due to Neff’s “vigorous” demands for its inclusion.342
The choice of words and their placement would matter. For Neff, “and 
to relate to” meant that the ITO Member would have explicit authority to 
determine the “necessity” of the measure and whether such measure quali-
fied as a circumstance enumerated in (related to) the subparagraphs of the 
provision. Neff argued for the retention of the phrase “in the context in 
which it is found because it involves a substantive matter.”343 Neff added 
that the wording created an “independent clause” that made it “clear” that 
the United States could take “unilateral action.”344 In his modern assessment 
of this meeting, Professor Kenneth Vandevelde concluded that under Neff’s 
proposed language, “[a] member could avoid any Charter obligation by a 
mere unilateral invocation of its essential security interests.”345 Vandevelde 
put it bluntly: “Neff’s proposal regarding the national security exception[s] 
was nothing less than an assault on the Charter as an instrument of the rule 
of law.”346
Evans, Leddy, and Robert Terrill (an economist and Associate Chief of 
the International Resources Division, DOS) “objected strongly” to retaining 
the words “and to relate to,” arguing that “such a provision destroyed the 
entire efficacy of the Charter.”347 They reminded the negotiators that the se-
curity exceptions were not limited to controlling “what the US may do,” but 
instead would permit covered actions by any member state, thereby provid-
ing “means for unilateral action [that] w[ould] surely be abused by some 
countries.”348 They feared that if a Member could rely on “the pretext of na-
tional security” to “take any measure whatsoever it might wish in complete 
disregard of all provisions of the Charter” the ITO would be destroyed.349
Leddy argued it would be far better to abandon the work on the Charter than 
allow for such a “legal escape.”350
Yet Neff was unwavering that the United States “be given a free hand 
to make whatever decisions may be necessary without challenge by the 
340. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328.




345. See KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THE FIRST BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES:
U.S. POSTWAR FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE, AND NAVIGATION TREATIES 148 (2017).
346. Id. at 153.
347. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 2.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 3.
350. Id.
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ITO.”351 Evans challenged Neff, arguing that, because the United States 
“would be a sufficiently strong and important member” of the ITO, if the 
United States had “a bona fide national security problem, the Organization 
would not be able to do otherwise than make a finding in our favour.”352 Os-
car Ryder  stated that “as a practical matter no injury could possibly come to 
the US” as a result of the ITO’s evaluation of whether “the measures intro-
duced by the US were in fact taken in the interest of national security.”353 In 
any case, Wilcox “did not think that the ITO would ever become an interna-
tional forum to discuss national security interests.”354 Before the vote, there 
was no further elaboration of the Charter’s consultation or dispute settle-
ment procedures or of the body to interpret the national security excep-
tions.355
Thorp, Neff, and one other delegate356 voted for retaining Neff’s “and to 
relate to” language; whereas Julean Arnold (Policy Division, State Depart-
ment), Brown, Evans, Harry C. Hawkins (Chief of the Commercial Policy 
Division and Agreements),357 Leddy, Rubin, Ryder, Robert B. Schwenger 
(Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture), and 
Terrill voted against Neff’s language and sought to instead include the 
phrase “relating to” at the beginning of  sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).358 De-
feated, Neff asked to record his dissent, and Wilcox granted him the oppor-
tunity to author a memorandum on the subject.359
After the vote, Neff proposed a provision whereby any challenges relat-
ing to national security measures would be heard by the ICJ, rather than the 
ITO.360 Neff justified this amendment to Rubin’s draft on the basis that Sen-
351. Id.




356. The identity of the delegate is unclear, but it was likely Edgar Brossard, an agricul-
tural economist who had served on the Tariff Commission staff. See UNITED STATES 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, A Centennial History of the United States Internation-
al Trade Commission, USITC Publication 4744, at 204 (2017), https://www.usitc.gov/
documents/final_centennial_history_508_compliant_v2.pdf.
357. Many in the State Department held Hawkins in the highest respect. In an oral inter-
view, John Leddy said that Hawkins was “probably the most influential and important man 
second to Cordell Hull, in launching, operating and administering the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements.” Brown Oral History, supra note 133, ¶¶ 4–5. Winthrop Brown further noted it 
was Hawkins who was “Hull’s right-hand man in trade agreements” and, in late 1945, “had a 
vision of a post-war world in which tariffs and trade barriers would be reduced, and there 
would be an international institution which would bring order into international trade and pro-
vide a forum for settlement of disputes; which would generally aid in international coopera-
tion in trade expansion.” Id. 
358. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 3.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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ator Millikin, Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, had “vigorously ob-
jected” to having the ITO determine “whether measures adopted by the US 
were taken in defense of the national security.”361 Senator Millikin feared 
“excessive interference in domestic matters.”362 Neff reminded the negotia-
tors that Millikin was staunchly against the general interpretive power of the 
ITO or even the ICJ when it came to questions of national security.363
The same day, following the U.S. negotiators’ heated meeting, the na-
tional delegations participating in the Geneva preparatory work received the 
United States’ “July 4” draft of a “Miscellaneous” chapter containing the 
revised security exceptions, based on the agreed changes to Rubin’s draft 
exceptions article.364 The introductory language of the security exceptions 
provision submitted to the delegations at that time read:
Nothing in this Charter shall be construed to require any Member to 
furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contra-
ry to its essential security interests, or to prevent any Member from 
taking any action which it may consider to be necessary to such in-
terests:
a) Relating to fissionable materials or their source materials;
b) Relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of 
war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is car-
ried on for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;
c) In time of war or other emergency in international relations, re-
lating to the protection of its essential security interests;
d) Undertaken in pursuance of obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity.365
In accordance with the U.S. negotiators’ July 4th vote, the draft lacked 
the phrase “and to relate to” within the chapeau. It also lacked Neff’s draft 
of article 94(3)—the declaration that the Charter’s procedures relating to the 
361. Id.
362. U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum for U.S. Delegation, Suggested Changes for 
Chapter VIII, art. 81–89, at 5 (June 16, 1947) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation, Suggested Chang-
es for Chapter VIII, June 16, 1947] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, 
file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/April–June 20, 1947’).
363. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 3. 
364. U.S. Miscellaneous Chapter Proposal, July 4, 1947, supra note 298 (providing the 
official U.S. proposal for a new Miscellaneous chapter for review by the other national dele-
gations).
365. Id.
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interpretation and settlement of disputes would not apply to the other provi-
sions of article 94.
D.  The Neff And Rubin Memoranda on Unilateral Power to Interpret 
National Security
While other U.S. negotiators came from economic or foreign service 
backgrounds, Neff and Rubin were both skilled lawyers, experienced in in-
ternational business and international law.366 Rubin was a young Assistant 
Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs who joined the DOS in 1943 and the 
U.S. delegation in Geneva in 1947.367 As his legal advisor, Rubin became 
dear friends with Wilcox, and Rubin acknowledged that he served as one of 
Wilcox’s “principal assistants.”368 Rubin later became a key figure in inter-
national law, a professor at Washington College of Law, and later Executive 
Director of the American Society of International Law from 1975 to 1982.369
Following the meetings of July 2 and 4, 1947, Neff, Thorp, and Rubin 
each provided a memorandum to Wilcox regarding the appropriate interpre-
tation of the July 4 draft security exceptions article.370 Of particular interest 
here, Rubin and Neff took opposing positions on the need for explicit uni-
lateral authority to invoke an exception, the role of ITO bodies (the Execu-
tive Board and Conference) in interpreting the article, and the scope of the 
exceptions.
1. Neff’s Argument (Supported by Thorp): Unilateral Power to Interpret 
the Security Exceptions
Among several other issues, Neff sought to make explicit that “a politi-
cal body such as the ITO” should not have “full power” to interpret the se-
curity exceptions.371 Neff’s goal was to ensure that the United States would 
always have total, unilateral power to interpret the invocation of the excep-
366. For a background on Neff, see supra note 116.
367. Claudio Grossman et al., A Festschrift in Honor of Seymour J. Rubin, 10 AM. UN.
INT’L L. REV. 1245 (1995).
368. Oral History Interview by Neenah Ellis with Seymour Rubin, UNITED STATES 
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, at 11, No. RG 50.030*0449 (Jan. 6, 1997).
369. Grossman et al., supra note 367, at 1215.
370. These memoranda are attached to U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Delegation Meeting 
Minutes (July 16, 1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Del-
egation/Minutes/June 21–July 30, 1947’).
371. Harold Neff, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum to the Chairman of the U.S. Dele-
gation Regarding Security Exceptions to the ITO Charter, at 1 (July 10, 1947) [hereinafter 
Neff Memorandum] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Delega-
tion/Minutes/June 21–July 30, 1947’). Neff also discussed amendments to the July 4 Draft to 
ensure that the security exceptions aligned with U.S. policy and legislation, the omission of 
the words “directly or indirectly,” and the inclusion of the word “essential” for “essential se-
curity interests.”
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tion provision. As Neff noted: “The power to interpret is the power to de-
stroy.”372
In early Charter drafts, Services had sought to afford “full [interpretive] 
power” to the ICJ, its preferred choice over a political body like the ITO.373
But, as mentioned above, U.S. Senate Committee hearings following the 
New York drafting meeting confirmed that Senator Eugene Millikin, Chair 
of the Senate Finance Committee had raised concerns about the ICJ address-
ing questions involving security issues.374 According to Neff, the DOS had 
guaranteed to Millikin that the security exceptions (as contained within the 
single provision) would “be worded so as to give to each Member freedom 
to apply them as it determines in the interests of its own security.”375 Neff 
believed that the recent July 4, 1947 draft provision instead granted the ITO 
“general power” to interpret the Charter.376 Neff insisted that U.S. negotia-
tors amend the security exceptions article to clarify that “the unilateral pow-
er of interpretation will . . . rest with the United States as to the content of 
the exceptions.”377 Neff’s comments reflected two overlapping demands: 
First, no political bodies should judge U.S. security actions; and second, the 
U.S. should have absolute discretion in determining actions regarding U.S. 
security interests. Neff’s comment also displayed the divide between the 
Services Departments and the State Department; within the U.S. negotia-
tors’ meetings, State officials frequently emphasized the powers of other
ITO members to interpret the scope of the security exceptions, while Ser-
vices focused on U.S. powers alone.
For Neff, the “power of unilateral determination” ought to stem from 
the word “consider” in the chapeau of the exception provision. However, 
Neff argued that the word “consider” was “put in the middle of a phrase in a 
completely unemphasized form.”378 In his view, the U.S. negotiators should 
be “clear and conspicuous” about reserving states’ unilateral power of inter-
pretation to determine when to use an exception to depart from Charter 
principles.379 In seeking to lend support to his proposal, Neff added that in 
the July 4 version, “unilateral interpretation is not really reserved by the 
language used even if the person interpreting gave the most complete value 
to the word ‘consider,’ which is not in itself inevitable.”380
Neff then turned to the enumerated sub-paragraphs: “a) Relating to fis-
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arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods 
and materials as is carried on for the purpose of supplying a military estab-
lishment . . . .”381 He argued that “the ‘relating’ clauses modify the term ‘ac-
tion’ [in the clause’s chapeau],” and that they “qualify and condition that 
noun.”382 Neff argued that the “extent of the qualification and condition” 
presented a question of interpretation. However, according to Neff, the word 
“considers” failed to modify “the content of the condition.”383 Neff ex-
plained that the “effect of the language is to say that, if a measure relates, 
for example, to arms, ammunition and implements of war, then a Member 
may take such action as it deems necessary.”384 Thus, the July 4 draft failed 
to grant unilateral power to Members “to determine with finality what falls 
within the terms used.”385 Neff argued that the “content” of the exceptions 
improperly did “not fall within the power of any individual Member to de-
termine.”386 This problem was amplified by the “one-member one-vote” rep-
resentation then present in the ITO Charter, whereby the United States 
“would not have any greater vote in the ITO than Lebanon” should the ITO 
bodies have the power to interpret the Charter.387
Neff added that the approach taken in the July 4 draft contravened the 
approach the United States took in the United Nations Charter, where the 
United States had “reserved the complete power of unilateral action in re-
gard to any matter affecting its national security.”388 Neff observed that in 
those negotiations, the ECEFP had compromised on a formula and “specifi-
cally stated” their intent that “the formula was such as to reserve power to 
the United States to prohibit, in time of peace, shipments such as would cor-
respond to the scrap and petroleum shipments to Japan” in World War II.389
However, since “any export control exercised in peacetime pursuant to the 
powers reserved by the security exceptions” would interfere with other 
states’ domestic economies, “it would seem imperative that the power of in-
terpretation should not rest with a political body such as the ITO.”390
Neff was particularly troubled by the July 4, 1947 meeting, where he 
believed that he had failed to “make it absolutely clear that there was unilat-
eral power to interpret,” and that the other U.S. negotiators lacked “the in-
tent to reserve full power of unilateral interpretation.”391 Neff reiterated that 
381. Id.
382. Id. (underlining in original).
383. Id.
384. Id. (emphasis added).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. See also Report of the Drafting Committee—New York Draft Charter and Draft 
GATT supra note 274, art. 64 (laying out the voting representation of the Conference).
388. Neff Memorandum, supra note 371 (underlining in original).
389. Id. at 3.
390. Id. (underlining in original).
391. Id.
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the political ITO bodies should not have authority to determine the “rela-
tively imprecise content” of the security exceptions.392 Neff’s final word on 
the matter was to reiterate what he had said on July 4th, that the DOS had 
told the U.S. Senate that each ITO member “was to have freedom to apply 
the security exceptions ‘as it determines in the interests of its own securi-
ty.’”393
Captain Thorp’s brief memorandum added to Neff’s arguments. He 
recognized that having security exceptions subject to interpretation by the 
ITO bodies was “not satisfactory from a national security standpoint.”394 He 
signaled that such a procedure was unacceptable to the War and Navy De-
partments, and he had “grave doubts” Congress would find it acceptable ei-
ther. Moreover, he also believed that “iron bound military exceptions would 
have very little, if any, effect on World Trade.”395 He further added there 
could be no ITO unless Members committed to the “spirit” of the Charter as 
much as they committed to its rules. Adherence to both was necessary in 
light of the fact that the Charter would never be “entirely free from legal 
loopholes.” 396 Thorp closed his memorandum by recalling that the “Muni-
tions Control Act” was deemed consistent with the United Nations Charter 
when it was presented to U.S. Congress, and asserted that it would “there-
fore seem that if any international body were to have the power of interpre-
tation in such matters it should be the International Court of Justice.”397
2. Rubin’s Argument: Oversight to Ensure Bona Fide 
Invocation of the Exceptions
Rubin also focused on the power of interpretation, and he argued that 
the existing U.S. delegation draft afforded the U.S. government the leeway 
it needed to address its security matters. Rubin began his memorandum by 
observing that Neff had proposed language (“from taking any action which 
it may consider to relate to:”) that made it “perfectly clear that any Member 
had the unilateral power to decide that any action which it proposed to take 
did relate to the matters contained in the lettered paragraphs.”398 Rubin be-
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Captain Wakeman B. Thorp, U.S. Dep’t of State, Memorandum to the Chairman of 
the U.S. Delegation, at 1 (July 11, 1947) [hereinafter Thorp Memorandum] (on file with 




397. Id. See also PROPOSED MUNITIONS CONTROL ACT, supra note 308.
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Delegation, at 1 (July 14, 1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file 
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lieved that Neff’s version would “make unchallengeable by the Organiza-
tion or any other Member a justification, however far-fetched, of any action 
on this basis.”399 That the July 4 draft did not “permit this completely open 
escape from the Charter” could be seen, as Neff had argued, to “limit the 
scope of the unilateral interpretation” of the security exceptions.400 The ben-
efit of the July 4 draft was that it prevented other ITO Members from invok-
ing Neff’s “broader” exceptions, a sincere concern for Rubin.401
The security exceptions article was “drafted sufficiently broad[ly] to 
take care of any reasonable case.”402 This framed Rubin’s explanation that 
his draft of the security exceptions aspired “to provide for unilateral deter-
mination by each Member, unchallenged by any other Member, as to what 
action it deems necessary in a field ‘relating to’ the listed subjects.”403 As 
such, Rubin wrote, no challenge could exist to a U.S. action that:
1) falls in the field of fissionable materials, etc; no challenge can 
be made  to any regulation which we may enact regulating the 
use of “source materials” for fissionable materials, or the traffic 
in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, no matter how 
remote may be considered the relevance of the measures under-
taken to the problem to be solved, if the measure falls in any of 
these fields; or
2) if the measure relates to any of these fields of interest—another 
phrase which grants broad power of unilateral determination.404
To further support this phrasing, Rubin corrected Neff’s assessment of 
the Senate Finance Committee testimony. There was no “commitment to go 
farther than these broad and unilateral exceptions” offered by the U.S. dele-
gation, Rubin argued.405 Nor did the Senate Finance Committee display any 
interest in negating the Charter “by such a broad and unilateral security ex-
ception [provision] that any action, no matter how little related to security, 
would be immune even from question.”406 Reciting the transcript, Rubin 
demonstrated that Senator Millikin never suggested that “a safeguard ought 
to be written into the Charter so broad that actions which are not ‘arrange-
ments regarding fissionable materials’ must, on the unilateral statement of a 
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concerned with wording that “would have allowed any action taken under 
the security exception[s] to be brought before the International Court by any 
complainant Member.”408 However, the July 4 draft made clear that “no ac-
tion in or relating to certain fields where national security is concerned can 
be questioned, whether before the Organisation or the Court.”409 Rubin ex-
plained that this amendment was in line with the DOS’s commitment that 
the security exceptions “would be worded so as to give each Member free-
dom to apply them as it determines in the interest of its own security.”410
Rubin also quashed Neff’s claim that the United States needed to re-
serve unilateral interpretation in the ITO Charter’s exceptions to correspond 
with the U.S. reservation of unilateral action in the United Nations Charter. 
Rubin equated this request with the United States’ veto power and conclud-
ed that “it is not, as far as I know, present (if it was past) U.S. policy to sup-
port the veto principle in international affairs.”411 “Certainly,” Rubin opined, 
the U.S. attitude is “not that the veto must be reserved for all nations which 
come into any international organization, ITO or any other.”412
Rubin argued that the security exceptions retained “a great deal of lee-
way for unilateral interpretation” without rendering the Charter “an illusory 
document.”413 Rubin concluded that “the U.S. can justify such security 
measures as it may contemplate as ‘relating to’ one of the listed subjects; 
and that the present phraseology does give to the U.S. freedom to apply the 
exception [provision]—provided that it is the exception [provision] and not 
something else which it applies—’as it determines in the interest of its own 
security.’”414 Rubin’s memorandum suggested a role for the ITO bodies and 
the ICJ to objectively determine whether an ITO member was abusing the 
exception provision.
VI.  A Backdrop to the Internal U.S. Deliberations: 
The Geneva Preparatory Meetings
These internal U.S. debates occurred while the U.S. negotiators partici-
pated in the Geneva preparatory committee meetings. At meetings with oth-
er delegations in Geneva, the U.S. delegation had to explain the newly 
phrased security exceptions and to clarify how the Organization would ad-
dress disputes that involved national security. Over seventy years later, U.S. 
delegate John Leddy’s remarks in these Geneva meetings were heavily cited 
by the WTO’s Russia—Traffic in Transit panel as evidence that the U.S. 
408. Id. at 3.
409. Id. (emphasis added).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. (emphasis added).
413. Id.
414. Id. (emphasis added).
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delegation had long recognized that oversight of the security exceptions 
would be necessary due to the significant risk of its abuse for protectionist 
purposes.415 The delegates’ discussion was also relied upon by the United 
States in its third party submissions to emphasize that the delegations al-
ways recognized that there would be “no formal review” of a Member’s in-
vocation of the security exceptions.416 This section considers the exchanges 
between the U.S. delegation and the other delegations, finding that there ap-
peared to be agreement that trade disputes involving politically sensitive 
matters were reviewable within the nullification or impairment procedure of 
the ITO.
On July 24, 1947, in Geneva, Commission A of the United Nations 
Preparatory Committee considered two versions of the security excep-
tions.417 In the sections that follow, discussion of the delegates’ meeting is 
bifurcated based on each version. First, the delegates debated the language 
of article 37 of the New York Draft Charter, which maintained an introduc-
tory prohibition on arbitrary or non-justifiable discrimination. In this discus-
sion, the delegates debated the open-ended language of “essential security 
interests,” and of an “emergency” as each was set out in subparagraph (e). 
Second, the delegates debated the U.S. proposal to create a new Charter 
chapter that would render the security exceptions (now in article 94) appli-
cable to the entire Charter, along with provisions respecting the nullification 
and impairment procedure, the interpretation of the Charter, and the settle-
ment of disputes.
A.  Delegates’ Meeting Regarding the Scope and Meaning of the New 
York Charter Security Exception
On July 24, 1947, Commission A began by debating the language and 
phrasing of article 37 of the New York Charter draft.418 In particular, Dr. 
Antonius Bernadus Speekenbrink (Director General, Foreign Economic Re-
lations, Ministry of Economic Affairs), the delegate from the Netherlands,419
sought clarification as to the meaning of the phrases “emergency in interna-
tional relations” and “essential security interests,” as both were contained 
415. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶ 7.90; U.N. Econ. and Soc. 
Council Comm’n, 2d Sess., 33d mtg. at 20, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33 (July 24, 1947).
416. Third Party Executive Summary of United States of America, Russia—Traffic in 
Transit, ¶¶ 25-26, WTO Doc. WT/DS512 (Feb. 27, 2018). 
417. See U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, 2d Sess., 33d mtg., at 3–5, GATT Doc. 
E/PC/T/A/SR/33 (July 24, 1947); Hahn, supra note 38, at 613–14. 
418. Id.
419. The State Department’s private notes on Dr. Speekenbrink identified him as having 
a “[v]ery attractive personality” and being “[e]ffective in negotiation” based on his work in 
London in the preparatory committee. U.S. Dep’t of State, Antonius Bernadus Speekenbrink 
Biographic Data, attached to Office Memorandum from L.D. Heck to Mr. Swayzee (May 5, 
1947) (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 132, A1 704, file ‘Biographies part 1’).
170 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:109
within subparagraph (e) of article 37.420 Dr. Speekenbrink specifically raised 
concern that agriculture would be captured by this wording, noting that in a 
time of emergency Members might claim, “it is essential for me to bring as 
much food to the country as possible.”421
As the language stemmed from the original U.S. draft, Leddy explained 
the U.S. thinking on the language to the Commission. He elaborated that the 
phrase “essential security interests” was a product of the U.S. government’s 
concern with having “too wide an exception,” and the fact they could not 
simply say: “by any Member of measures relating to a Member’s security 
interests,” as that would “permit anything under the sun.”422 Leddy ex-
plained that the U.S. negotiators “thought it well to draft provisions which 
would take care of real security interests and, at the same time, so far as we 
could, to limit the exception[s] so as to prevent the adoption of protection 
for maintaining industries under every conceivable circumstance.”423 It bears 
mention that in the first preparatory meeting in London, Speekenbrink (as 
Chairman of the Procedures Sub-Committee) and Leddy (as Rapporteur of 
the Procedures Sub-Committee) had already discussed the potential abuse of 
the exceptions provisions.424 In addition, throughout the entire Charter nego-
tiation, the Netherlands took “the lead in advocating maximum use of the 
International Court of Justice.”425
As for the consideration of what might constitute an “emergency,” Led-
dy observed the limitation of “time”—that is, “in time of war.”426 Speaking 
to the context of “time of war,” Leddy remarked that “no one would ques-
tion the need of a Member, or the right of a Member, to take action relating 
to its security interests and to determine for itself—which I think we cannot 
deny—what its security interests are.”427 As for the reference to emergency, 
Leddy remarked that the U.S. had in mind the situation that existed before it 
entered the Second World War at the end of 1941, where the U.S. govern-
ment “required, for our own protection, to take many measures which would 
420. U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n A, Verbatim Report on Its Thirty-
Third Meeting, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33, at 19 (July 24, 1947) [hereinafter Verbatim Re-
port of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A]. Article 37(e) of the New York Draft 
Charter considered by the Commission read: “In time of war or other emergency in interna-
tional relations, relating to the protection of the essential security interests of a Member.”
421. Id. at 19.
422. Id. at 20.
423. U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n A, Corrigendum to Verbatim Report 
of Its Thirty-Third Meeting, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/33.Corr.3 (July 30, 1947) [hereinafter 
Comm’n A, Corrigendum 3] (emphasis added).
424. U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n II, Technical Subcomm, U.N. Doc. E/
PC/T/C.II/50, at 9 (Nov. 13, 1946).
425. WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN, JR., THE UNITED STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF 
WORLD TRADE 92, n.6 (1950).
426. Verbatim Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, supra note 420, at 
20.
427. Id.
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have been prohibited by the Charter.”428 Chairman of Commission A, Erik 
Colban, reminded the delegates that “the atmosphere inside the ITO will be 
the only efficient guarantee against abuses of the kind to which the Nether-
lands Delegate has drawn our attention.”429
A related observation came from Dr. H.C. Coombs, Chief of the Aus-
tralian delegation, days earlier. He raised concern with separating trade and 
security considerations regarding fissionable materials, especially with the 
possibility that atomic energy could become an important source of indus-
trial energy.430 He further recommended consultation with an appropriate 
international body, though he did not name they body he had in mind.
B.  Evaluating the ITO Atmosphere as Safeguarding 
Invocation of the Security Exceptions
In its Russia—Traffic in Transit submissions, the United States placed 
emphasis on Chairman Eric Colban’s reference to the “atmosphere” inside 
the ITO  as evidence that the delegations recognized the security excep-
tions’ self-judging and non-justiciable nature.431 Another reading, however, 
is that Colban was seeking to strengthen ITO review over the exceptions, 
not to dismiss it outright. Due to the complexity of designing the ITO, there 
had to be something “else”—an undefined element—that would confine and 
manage the breadth of open-ended terms found within the security excep-
tions.
Under this reading, Colban’s belief in the atmosphere of the ITO re-
vealed the “moral pressures” which would not serve as an alternative to the 
formal disputes procedure, but instead would support it, by incorporating 
“milder” law into the legal design.432 This reading is supported by trade 
scholar Robert Hudec, who argued that the national delegations described 
the ITO’s “atmosphere” or “spirit” as dependent upon the informal and dip-
lomatic techniques of its Member States.433 Hudec convincingly explained 
how such an “atmosphere” was akin to a “milder” form of law that allowed 
negotiating governments, including the U.S. negotiators, to rely on “tech-
niques of the diplomat” to shape the ITO’s legal remedies via the nullifica-
tion or impairment procedure. The “normative pressures”434 created through 
428. Id.
429. Id. at 21.
430. U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n A, Verbatim Report on Its 30th Meet-
ing, GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/30, at 16 (July 16, 1947).
431. See Third Party Executive Summary of United States of America, Russia—Traffic 
in Transit, supra note 416, ¶ 26.
432. See U.N. Economic and Social Council Comm’n B, Note Submitted by the Delega-
tion of Belgium-Luxembourg, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/W/257, at § 5 (July 31, 1947).
433. See HUDEC, supra note 65, at 30–36, 40–41; see also Joost H. B. Pauwelyn, The
Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (observing the emergence of a 
law-and-politics narrative in the origins of the multilateral trade system).
434. HUDEC, supra note 65, at 35.
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this procedure would “contain trade disputes—to rebalance expectations, 
and to avoid escalation.”435 The goal was to “modulate the pressures accord-
ing to circumstances,” avoiding the failure of the ITO “whenever full com-
pliance was not possible.”436 Thus, in the early days of the Charter, the 
community would “focus the pressures at a particular time, on a particular 
part, and toward a particular result.”437 In addition, the nullification or im-
pairment procedure was seen to provide “equitable remedies for trade inju-
ries not involving a breach of legal obligations” arising from the Charter.438
Some commentators have drawn on this feature of the early legal design as 
a way to illustrate the delegations’ awareness that political controversies 
might not always be “settled” with judicial decision-making.439
This understanding is further supported by the fact that other U.S. nego-
tiators referenced the need to complement the rules with an over-arching 
faith in the ITO and trade multilateralism. For example, the U.S. Tariff 
Commission had observed the need for Members to recognize the “spirit” of 
the multilateral trade system, rather than seek to simply obey its rules.440
Thus, Colban’s remarks do not suggest non-reviewability. Instead the refer-
ence to the organization’s “atmosphere” signals how delegations recognized 
the need to embed diplomacy within the institution for the success of the
embryonic dispute settlement mechanism.441 In other words, “atmosphere” 
was not viewed as an alternative to a review via the ITO dispute settlement 
procedure. Rather, the “atmosphere” was an assumed aspect of the structure 
that supported the formal process. To be clear, there is no evidence to con-
firm that the ITO’s “atmosphere” precluded ITO bodies (the Executive 
Board or Conference of Members) from reviewing the legality of a measure.
In sum, there were two elements to the idea of the ITO’s “atmosphere”: 
First, some diplomatic techniques were required to aid legal rules and pro-
cedures, enabling governments to negotiate what may have been “right” or 
“fair” in trade disputes; and, second, the existence of the ITO meant that 
“now there was an organization capable of issuing third-party decisions 
about what was ‘right’ and ‘fair’,” coupled with “community pressure be-
hind those judgments.”442 In the context of the security exceptions, the refer-
ence to “atmosphere” could signal that the delegates accepted the impreci-
435. ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER 205 (2011).
436. HUDEC, supra note 65, at 34.
437. Id. at 35.
438. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence, 4 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 616, 616 (1970).
439. See Hahn, supra note 38, at 613; LANG, supra note 435, at 202–203.
440. See U.S. TARIFF COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF GENEVA DRAFT CHARTER FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION 89–90 (1947) [hereinafter 1947 Tariff Commission 
Report].
441. See generally Pauwelyn, supra note 433.
442. HUDEC, supra note 65, at 36.
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sion of the language, knowing the ITO and its procedures would facilitate 
consultations if and when disputes arose.443 The early multilateral trade or-
ganization was therefore not simply made up of rules, it included “back-
ground processes,” community opinion, and flexibility towards rules and 
remedies.444
C.  Delegates’ Meeting Regarding the New U.S. Proposal for a Security 
Exceptions Article
In the same July 24, 1947 meeting, Commission A continued the dis-
cussion on the security exceptions’ proper form, turning now to the United 
States’ July 4 proposal to incorporate the exceptions as part of a new Mis-
cellaneous chapter. The Chairman began by questioning whether the new 
exceptions, moved to article 94, were now segregated from the “sanction 
clauses of Chapter V,” including article 35.445 The Chairman asked the dele-
gations to “make up [their] minds [about] whether [they were] in agreement 
that these clauses should not provide for any possibility of redress.”446 It was 
a puzzling place to begin, as the U.S. proposal (matching Kellogg’s initial 
proposal for a new Miscellaneous chapter) was quite clear that the new 
chapter included both nullification or impairment and dispute settlement 
procedures, as contained in articles 35(2) and 86 of the New York Draft 
Charter, respectively.447
1. Debate over the Relationship to the Nullification 
or Impairment Procedure
Leddy, speaking for the U.S. delegation, responded to the relationship 
between the exceptions provision and the nullification or impairment proce-
dure in article 35:
I think that the place of an Article in the Charter has nothing to do 
with whether or not it comes under Article 35. Article 35 is very 
broad in its terms, and I think probably covers any action by any 
Member under any provision of the Charter. It is true that an action 
taken by a Member under Article 94 could not be challenged in the 
sense that it could not be claimed that the Member was violating 
the Charter; but if that action, even though not in conflict with the 
443. Id. at 30; see U.S. Dep’t of State, ECEFP, Interpretive Articles on the ITO Charter, 
ECEFP D-135/47, at 2 (Oct. 29, 1947) (on file with NACP, record group 353, box 52, E.192, 
file ‘5.19B ECEFP Meetings, Documents 116/47-135/47’).
444. See LANG, supra note 435 at 202–205.
445. Verbatim Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, supra note 420, at 
25–26 (speaking to articles 34 and 35 as related to emergency actions and consultations for 
nullification or impairment, respectively).
446. Id. at 26.
447. U.S. Proposal, July 4, 1947 supra note 299, at 12. At this time, article 35(1) re-
mained within the commercial policy chapter of the draft Charter.
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terms of Article 94, should affect another Member, I should think 
that Member should have the right to seek redress of some kind un-
der Article 35 as it now stands. In other words, there is no excep-
tion from the application of Article 35 to this or any other Article.448
Mr. Morton, the Australian delegate was “very glad to have the assur-
ance of the United States Delegate” that a Member’s rights under the nulli-
fication or impairment process (article 35(2)), were “not in any way im-
pinged” by the movement of the security exceptions.449 He proposed 
including a note in the Commission’s report clarifying Leddy’s statement, 
unless, he added flippantly, the United States only meant to give “one of 
those ‘kerbside’ opinions.”450 Leddy rejected a note specific to article 35’s 
application to article 94, on the basis it would “raise doubts elsewhere in the 
Charter.”451 However, he confirmed the U.S. view that “[a]rticle 35, in its 
terms, covers everything in the Charter.”452
In response to the request to place such a limit in article 94, rather than 
in the article 35 dispute settlement procedure itself, Leddy explained that if 
the delegates agreed that article 35 should not apply to article 94, then “a 
clear and explicit provision in Article 35 saying that no Member shall bring 
any complaint in respect of measures taken pursuant to Article 94” was re-
quired.453 Leddy stated, “[I]t is perfectly clear from the text that Article 35 
does apply to Article 94,” and that he would “rather have it left that way.”454
The discussion on this point concluded, suggesting Leddy had satisfied 
Morton that the nullification or impairment process outlined in article 35 
applied to the entire Charter.455
2. Implications for Modern Day Questions of Justiciability
Is Leddy’s response to the Chairman evidence that the exceptions were 
non-justiciable and self-judging in nature, as claimed by the United States in 
its recent Russia—Traffic in Transit submissions?456 It remains unclear 
448. Verbatim Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, supra note 420, at 
26–27.
449. Id. at 27.
450. See id.
451. Id. at 29.
452. Id. at 28.
453. See Comm’n A, Corrigendum 3, supra note 423.
454. See id. at 1.
455. Verbatim Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, supra note 420, at 
29.
456. See Third Party Executive Summary of United States of America, Russia—Traffic 
in Transit, supra note 416, at ¶ 27 (emphasizing Leddy’s remarks as “drafting history” and
arguing that they confirm that “the negotiators understood that the essential security exception 
[provision] was ‘so wide in its coverage’ that it was not justiciable; while the delegates con-
sidered that a claim for nullification or impairment ‘whether or not a measure conflicts’ with 
the agreement might be available, they were clear that a Member could not claim that another 
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whether Leddy sought to exclude review as to whether a Member had 
abused the security exceptions article, and I found no meeting minutes that 
recounted this Commission A meeting. It is true that Leddy defended the 
article’s connection to the nullification or impairment procedure. As written 
at the time, that procedure afforded power to ITO bodies to investigate mat-
ters, suggest further consultations, refer disputes to arbitration, and to enable 
corrective actions.457 There is nothing in his response to suggest an inability 
of ITO bodies to make findings and provide a recommendation on the prop-
er invocation of the security exceptions.
However, it may be possible to probe Leddy’s explanation against the 
prior U.S. negotiators’ meetings. To the other Commission delegates, Leddy 
explained that if the U.S. negotiators drafting article 94 had believed that 
“no Member shall bring any complaint in respect of measures taken pursu-
ant to Article 94,” they would have provided for this in a “clear and explicit 
provision.”458 For Leddy, it was “perfectly clear” from the text that article 35 
applied.459 Consider Leddy’s response as compared to another U.S. negotia-
tor’s remarks in the internal U.S. negotiators’ meeting on July 4, 1947. Re-
call that DOS official Evans had observed that where the U.S. had a “bona 
fide national security problem,” the ITO would “not be able to do otherwise 
than make a finding in our favour.”460 As a counterpoint to Neff, who had 
demanded total unilateral interpretive power, Evans appeared to show that 
objective analysis was acceptable to the U.S. negotiators, as the ITO could 
not deny a Member recourse to the security exceptions for bona fide securi-
ty concerns.461
3. Debate over Which Body Would Hold Interpretive Authority
During the Geneva meetings, some delegations proposed the creation of 
a “quasi-judicial tribunal” to handle issues of interpretation and enforcement 
of the Charter, which the U.S. delegation feared would be too costly.462 In 
this context, in a July 21, 1947 internal U.S. delegation meeting, Wilcox 
now recommended “freer access of appeal to the World Court” following
Member had violated the security exception[s] and therefore unsuccessfully invoked that ex-
ception.”). 
457. See WILCOX, supra note 187, at 159.
458. Comm’n A, Corrigendum 3, supra note 423.
459. Id.
460. Delegation Minutes, July 4, 1947, supra note 328, at 3 (emphasis original).
461. I thank Joel Trachtman for this point. As far as the record reflects, good faith was 
not mentioned during the exchange in Commission A, though the underlying U.S. discussions 
suggest this to be a relevant principle for national security claims. See supra text accompany-
ing note 402 (Rubin, highlighting the requirement of reasonableness).
462. U.S. Delegation to U.N. Secretariat, Second Meeting of the U.S. Preparatory 
Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade and Employment, Meeting Minutes, at 1 (July 21, 1947) 
[hereinafter Delegation Minutes, July 21, 1947] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 
133, A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/June 21–July 30, 1947’).
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concerns over costs and the politicization of disputes if they were kept 
strictly in-house at the ITO.463 He reasoned that an “impartial international 
tribunal” would prevent “smaller countries” from “gang[ing] up” on the 
United States.464 In addition, it would be “better to have disputes and ques-
tions relating to the interpretation of the Charter settled by an impartial in-
ternational tribunal in order to avoid decisions based on political considera-
tions which certainly would be the case with a political body.”465 To resolve 
their differences, U.S. negotiators agreed that the ICJ would have authority 
“to decide questions of law only on appeal from a decision reached by the 
ITO in the same manner that an appellate court in the US operates.”466
D.  Finalizing the U.S. Position and the Conclusion of Geneva
Despite the heated internal discussions between Neff and the other U.S. 
negotiators, a scheduled meeting with U.S. Secretary of War Kenneth Roy-
all suggested that the War Department had accepted the security exceptions’ 
language, despite rejection of Neff’s efforts to amend the provision during 
the U.S. delegation meeting held on July 2, 1947. When Royall visited Ge-
neva in August 1947, he dined with Neff, Wilcox, and Brown.467 While 
Royall was interested in Neff’s efforts to alter the security exceptions, he 
“did not insist upon” Neff’s proposals.468
Shortly thereafter, with the conclusion of Commission A’s work, all 
drafts were reviewed at the final plenary meetings of the Preparatory Com-
mittee.469 As submitted to the Preparatory Committee, article 94 of the Ge-
neva Draft Charter read, inter alia:
Nothing in this Charter shall be construed . . .
463. Id. Wilcox’s recommendation is a development from a month earlier, when Kel-
logg, in a U.S. delegation meeting, had elaborated on a proposal to combine articles 35(2) and 
86 to address legal disputes and economic matters, and to “defeat the France-Dutch proposal 
to have all disputes submitted to the International Court without any right on the part of the 
Organization to cut off such appeals.” See also U.S. Delegation, Suggested Changes for Chap-
ter VIII, June 16, 1947, supra note 362.
464. Delegation Minutes, July 21, 1947, supra note 462, at 23.
465. Id.
466. U.S. Delegation to U.N. Secretariat, Second Meeting of the U.S. Preparatory 
Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade and Employment, Meeting Minutes (July 24, 1947) (on 
file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/June 21–July 
30, 1947’).
467. U.S. Delegation to U.N. Secretariat, Second Meeting of the U.S. Preparatory 
Comm. for the Int’l Conf. on Trade and Employment, Meeting Minutes (Aug. 4, 1947) (on 
file with NACP, record group 43, box 133, A1 704, file ‘US Delegation/Minutes/July 31–
August 25, 1947’).
468. Id.
469. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council, Rep. of the Second Session of the Preparatory 
Comm. of the U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, WTO Archives E/PC/T/180, at 6 (Aug. 
19, 1947) [hereinafter Geneva Draft Charter].
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b) to prevent any Member from taking any action which it consid-
ers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
i. relating to fissionable materials or the materials from 
which they are derived;
ii. relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements 
of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supply-
ing a military establishment;
iii. taken in time of war or other emergency in international re-
lations; . . . .470
A 1947 commentary on the Geneva Draft Charter by Oscar Ryder and the 
U.S. Tariff Commission notes that article 94
reserves to the Members complete freedom of action to prohibit or 
regulate in any manner imports and exports of fissionable materials, 
implements of war, and supplies for the Army, Navy, and Air-
Force; that is to say, with respect to such items[,] exports or imports 
may be prohibited unqualifiedly or the Member may discriminate 
as to where it obtains its imports or sends its exports.471
Accordingly, the U.S. Tariff Commission concluded that article 94 
lacked any requirement that Members obtain the “approval of the Organiza-
tion for any action they take or refuse to take under these exceptions.”472
However, the commentary added that it appeared “likely that [Member’s] 
charges that the exceptions were being abused for protective or other pur-
poses would require consultation under Article 89,” with the possibility of a 
decision by the Organization under article 90 to reach a “satisfactory settle-
ment,” if necessary.473 According to the Tariff Commission, the interpreta-
tion and dispute settlement provisions constituted “an overriding authoriza-
tion for sanctions in any case . . . .”474 These articles were seen as 
“recognition that the Charter can be successful only if all the Members co-
operate in carrying out its spirit or objective as well as adhering to its de-
tailed terms.”475
In its Russia—Traffic in Transit submissions, the U.S. argued that the 
removal of the word “may” from the language of article 94(b) of the  Gene-
va Draft Charter “strengthened and emphasized” the “self-judging” nature 
470. Id. at 178.
471. 1947 Tariff Commission Report, supra note 440, at 95–96. 
472. Id. at 96.
473. Id. (emphasis added).
474. Id. at 89.
475. Id. at 89–90.
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of the security exceptions.476 (The language, “which it considers necessary,” 
was used in article XXI GATT.) As shown in this section, U.S. negotiators 
placed little emphasis on the word “may” in their Geneva meetings. Even 
Neff had retained the phrase “which it may consider” when arguing for 
Members’ sole power to interpret the security exceptions.477 Moreover, that 
the U.S. negotiators rejected amendments from the Services Departments to 
confirm a pure “self-judging” article, suggests that the removal of the word 
“may” from the adjectival clause does not evidence the United States’ inten-
tion for total unilateral power to interpret the security exceptions. Neverthe-
less, there is no further evidence within the archival record I recovered that 
confirmed the purpose of the word “may.”
VII.  Debates over Enforcement and
Political Questions in Havana
Fifty-nine state delegations attended the United Nations Conference to 
complete the ITO Charter in Havana, over twice as many delegations as at-
tended the first preparatory session in London.478 Invocation of the security 
exceptions was discussed in Havana, and the delegates agreed to construct a 
new provision to address the question of “the proper allocation of  responsi-
bility as between the Organization and the United Nations.”479
Sub-committee I (of the Conference’s Sixth Committee, which focused 
on ITO organization)—composed of delegates from Australia, Costa Rica, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Iraq, India, Pakistan, South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States—evaluated the article 94 security excep-
tions.480 The group considered the language endorsed at Geneva and rec-
ommended editing it to clarify its role within the ITO Charter.481 Following 
nine meetings, the Committee recommended minor modifications to the 
Geneva Draft Charter’s article.482 Among other things, article 94(b) was 
amended to include a phrase acknowledging Member action “either singly 
476. See Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, at 3, ¶11.
477. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
478. See generally BROWN, supra note 425, at 135–36.
479. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Rep. of Sub-Committee I 
(Article 94), GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/c.6/93, at ¶ 13 (Mar. 2, 1948) [hereinafter Report of Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948].
480. See id.
481. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Annotated Draft Agenda, 
GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/12, at 25 (Dec. 2, 1947) [hereinafter Sixth Committee, Annotated 
Draft Agenda].
482. See id.; U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Joint Sub-Committee of Commit-
tees V and VI, Draft Report of the Working Party, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.5&6/W.3 (Jan. 14, 
1948); Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, at 1 (observing
that apart from a “slight drafting change” the “Geneva draft has not been changed.”). The 
meeting notes of the ninth meeting were not found within the publicly-accessible WTO ar-
chives.
Spring 2020] Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security 179
or with other states,” and to “indicate more clearly that the sub-paragraphs 
refer to [excepted] ‘action’ and not to ‘essential security interests.’”483
Though Sub-committee I’s review of article 94 did not drastically change 
the language of article 94, it held “formal and informal discussions” as to 
the interpretation of the text.484
For example, in response to an Indian delegation proposal, the Sub-
committee discussed how the ITO would address actions taken in considera-
tion of “political” “essential interests.”485 The Indian delegation indicated 
that the phrase “essential security interests” in article 94 may “not be re-
garded always as embracing the ‘essential interests.’”486 The Indian delega-
tion raised the topic due to the exception for an “emergency in international 
relations,” where he believed such actions would fall. Other delegations also 
proposed amending article 94 to cover “any measure” or “any action . . .
which serves a political purpose contrary to the essential interests of that 
Member.”487 This sparked two discussions: First, whether and how the ITO 
would determine whether disputes involved political considerations or 
“economic interests under disguise of political interests.”488 Second, whether 
actions taken out of political interests fell within the scope of the United Na-
tions to manage, rather than under the authority of the ITO.489
In seeking to expand the scope of the security exceptions, the Indian 
delegate added that recourse to the nullification or impairment procedures, 
outlined in articles 89 and 90 of the draft Charter, could serve as a “deter-
483. Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, at ¶ 5, at-
tachment 1 at 6.
484. Id. at 1.
485. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of 
the First Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.26, at 2 (Jan. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the First Meeting] (detailing the Indian proposal that the 
exceptions cover “essential national interests” and not just “security interests”); see also Sixth 
Committee, Annotated Draft Agenda, supra note 481.
486. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of 
the Third Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.40, at 1 (Jan. 13, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Third Meeting]; see also Sub-Committee I (Article 94), 
Notes of the First Meeting, supra note 485, at 2; U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Second Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.32, at 1 
(Jan. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Second Meeting]. See
also Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, ¶ 13 (acknowl-
edging delegation proposals related to “actions taken in connection with political matters or 
with the essential interests of Members.”).
487. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Iraq: Amendment to Article 
94 (General exceptions), GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/12/Add.9, (Jan. 2, 1948); see also U.N. 
Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the 
Fourth Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.60, at 2–3 (Jan. 20, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fourth Meeting] (elaborating on the amendments pro-
posed by the Iraq delegation).
488. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the First Meeting, supra note 485, at 2. The 
identity of the inquiring delegation is not provided in the meeting notes.
489. Id.
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rent to any misuse of the exceptions.”490 The U.S. delegation did not offer 
detailed comment to this proposal; instead, it recommended an amendment 
to the general exceptions of the commercial policy chapter (that imposed a 
requirement that measures taken not be arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion between Members) to cover action “necessary to the enforcement of 
police measures or other laws relating to public safety.”491
Within the Sub-committee meetings, the UK delegation had also pro-
posed several amendments to article 94. For example, an amendment to the
chapeau of article 94(b) to clarify that the sub-paragraphs qualified “any ac-
tion” rather than the “essential security interests.”492 A UK proposal also 
sought to clarify that the Charter’s commitments would not prevent a mem-
ber from taking actions in accordance with the United Nations Charter.493
Moreover, the UK amendment proposed language whereby if action fell un-
der a security exception (the UK’s draft article 94(b)(1)(d)), then the Char-
ter’s dispute settlement procedures “shall not apply until the United Nations 
has made recommendations on or otherwise disposed of the matter.”494 At 
the fourth meeting, the U.S. delegation raised concern with the “practicabil-
ity” of determining “when the United Nations has ‘otherwise disposed of’ a 
matter.”495
An internal memorandum from Kellogg to Wilcox at this time further 
elaborates the UK proposals to amend the security exceptions. Kellogg re-
ported that the British interpreted the language “emergency in international 
relations” in article 94(b)(iii) “very narrowly.”496 Kellogg reported on three 
concerns by the British and his recommended U.S. responses. First, the Brit-
ish, Kellogg explained, believed that under the current text “a matter [that] 
has been referred to the UN would not be a clear indication that there was 
490. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Second Meeting, supra note 486, at 2.
491. Id.
492. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Amendment to Article 94 
Proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.48, art. 94(1)(d), 
at 1 (Jan. 16, 1948) [hereinafter Amendment to Article 94 Proposed by the UK Delegation]; 
see also Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Third Meeting, supra note 486, at 4 (ex-
plaining the suggestion that there be an amendment to “make it clear that the subsequent sub-
paragraphs qualified the word ‘action’ and not ‘interests.’”). The added text in article 94(b) 
was: “to prevent a[ny] Member, either singly or with other Members, from taking any action 
which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests; where such 
action . . . .” See Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, at 1–
2; Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 487.
493. Amendment to Article 94 Proposed by the UK Delegation, supra note 492.
494. Id. (referring to article 94(2), reproduced infra note 532). 
495. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 487, at 3.
496. Edmund Halsey Kellogg, U.S. Dep’t of State, Draft Memorandum to Clair Wilcox 
on Divergence of Views with British on Security Exceptions—Article 94, at 1 (Jan. 8, 1948) 
[hereinafter Kellogg Memorandum to Wilcox] (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 13, 
A1 698, file ‘Trade-Habana’).
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an emergency in international relations.”497 Kellogg responded that the Brit-
ish desire to widen the scope of the exception was “unrealistic” and, in any 
case, “[u]nder the present language” the ITO would “decide by a majority 
vote” as to “whether an ‘emergency exists’.”498 Despite the British proposed 
language, the “decision [for the ITO] on substance would be the same:” 
“[W]hether or not the matter was actually political in nature or was a dis-
guised effort to circumvent the Charter.” 499 Second, the British sought to 
exempt “action taken in connection with political issues arising in the fu-
ture . . . in connection with issues now before the UN.”500 Third, the British 
sought “exemption in connection with political matters not involving essen-
tial security interests,” whereas the U.S. delegation felt “the exception 
should be confined to bona fide security matters.”501 For the second and 
third concern, Kellogg offered a succinct response: The U.S. position was 
that future cases were addressed, but only those that involve “security inter-
ests.”502
To address the allocation of responsibility between the ITO and the 
United Nations, the Sub-committee responsible for article 94 recommended 
a new provision, which became article 86(3) of the Havana Charter.503 Bur-
ied in an annex, an interpretive note clarified that the Organization was re-
sponsible for questions raised by Members as to whether a measure was “in 
497. Id. at 1–2.
498. Id.
499. Id. (the British text was: “related to the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity or to the avoidance of political friction between states.”).
500. Id. at 2.
501. Id.
502. Id. at 3 (emphasis original).
503. The original text was devised as article 83A, later to become article 86(3). The pro-
vision stated: 
The Members recognize that the Organization should not attempt to take action 
which would involve passing judgment in any way on essentially political matters. 
Accordingly, and in order to avoid conflict of responsibility between the United 
Nations and the Organization with respect to such matters, any measure taken by a 
Member directly in connection with a political matter brought before the United 
Nations in accordance with the provisions of Chapters IV or VI of the United Na-
tions Charter shall be deemed to fall within the scope of the United Nations, and 
shall not be subject to the provisions of this Charter.
Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, ¶¶13–15. One of 
the discussions in the Havana meeting that led to the aforementioned report (on the link be-
tween economic measures and political questions) contained confirmation from Clair Wilcox 
that the U.S. considered the Organization an economic one, and it “should therefore not judge 
any measure employed in connection with a political dispute when that political dispute was
within the jurisdiction of the United Nations.” U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth 
Comm., Summary Record of the 37th Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/SR.37, at 3 (Mar. 
11, 1948); see Michael J Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s
Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 612–614 (1991) (offering analysis on the impli-
cations of art. 86(3)).  
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fact taken directly in connection with a political matter brought before the 
United Nations.”504 However, the note added that “if political issues beyond 
the competence of the Organization are involved the question shall be 
deemed to fall within the scope of the United Nations.”505
Additionally, the UK delegation sought changes to the text of article 94 
with sub-paragraph (2) to make explicit that Members could seek recourse 
under the nullification or impairment procedures for compensatory 
measures when appropriate.506 A U.S. delegate offered  the “preliminary” 
view that an explicit reference to this procedure within article 94 was “un-
necessary” since it repeated the text of the consultation – nullification or 
impairment provision in article 89(b).507 While the UK delegation was hap-
py to have the “applicability of articles 89 and 90 written into the record” 
rather than in the text of article 94, it added that “the proviso suggested in 
paragraph 2 was not intended to exclude the ITO from participation in the 
ultimate solution of a matter after the United Nations had acted.”508 Further 
discussion was required to understand “at what stage” the Charter’s dispute 
settlement procedure would apply.509 It appeared that further clarification of 
the text was in order.
On this matter, Sub-committee I recognized that Sub-committee G was 
responsible for confirming the relationship between article 94 and the dis-
pute settlement provisions (articles 89, 90, and 91).510 Nevertheless, Sub-
committee I recorded that “[t]here was some suggestion that action taken 
under Article 94 could not be prevented, or questioned, under other articles, 
but that the effects of that action might be the subject of consultation or 
504. 1948 Havana Charter, supra note 64, art. 86, ¶ 3.
505. Report of Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Mar. 2, 1948, supra note 479, ¶ 4; see also
1948 Havana Charter, supra note 64, art. 86, ¶ 3.
506. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Sub-Committee on Chapter 
VIII (Settlement of Differences - Interpretation), Summary Record of the Third Meeting, 
GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.41, at 1 (Jan. 13, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-Committee on Chapter 
VIII, Summary Record of the Third Meeting, Jan. 13, 1948]; Amendment to Article 94 Pro-
posed by the UK Delegation. Article 94(2) of the British proposal read: 
If any action taken by a Member under paragraph 1 of this Article nullifies or im-
pairs any benefit accruing to another Member directly or indirectly the procedure
set forth in Chapter VIII of this Charter shall apply and the Organization may au-
thorize such other Member to suspend the application to the Member taking the ac-
tion of such obligations or concessions under or pursuant to this Charter as the Con-
ference deems appropriate; provided that where the action is taken under paragraph 
1(d) of this Article the procedure set forth in Chapter VIII of this Charter shall not 
apply until the United Nations has made recommendations on or otherwise dis-
posed of the matter.
507. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 487 at 3.
508. Id.
509. Id.
510. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Third Meeting, supra note 486, at 3.
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complaint, and that a member affected by such action might accordingly 
seek release from some corresponding obligations.”511
According to the meeting notes, it was the Indian delegation which had 
the last word in the fourth meeting of sub-Committee I. The Indian repre-
sentative “expressed some doubt” as to whether under the UK’s proposed 
article 94(2) “the bona fides of an action allegedly coming within article 94 
could be questioned and also whether such an action could be countered col-
lectively by Members of the Organization or only by affected Members in-
dividually.”512 The Indian delegation added that it understood the “intention” 
of the UK proposed draft to be to confirm that “counteraction” was limited 
to “compensatory action” and not “punitive action.”513 The next meeting 
discussed political measures brought before the United Nations and con-
firmed the delegations’ agreement to create a new provision, as derived 
from the UK delegation’s draft of sub-articles 94(1)(d) and (2), in a new ar-
ticle on “Relations with the United Nations.”514
Just before Sub-committee I’s third meeting, the Sixth Committee’s 
Sub-committee G offered its own report as to whether the draft Charter’s 
nullification or impairment procedure (article 89) should cover the invoca-
tion of the security exceptions.515 The outcome was that non-violation com-
plaints of nullification or impairment (article 89(b)) “would apply to the sit-
uation of action taken by a Member[,] such as action pursuant to Article 94 
of the Charter.”516 Sub-committee G confirmed that:
Such action, for example, in the interest of national security in time 
of war or other international emergency would be entirely con-
sistent with the Charter, but might nevertheless result in the nullifi-
cation or impairment of benefits accruing to other Members. Such 
other Members should, under those circumstances, have the right to 
bring the matter before the Organization, not on the ground that the 
measures taken was inconsistent with the Charter, but on the 
ground that the measure so taken effectively nullified benefits ac-
cruing to the complaining Member.517
511. Id. (emphasis original); see also Sub-Committee on Chapter VIII, Summary Record 
of the Third Meeting, Jan. 13, 1948.
512. Sub-Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fourth Meeting, supra note 487, at 3. It 
is unclear whether the Indian position was that there should be review and this language failed 
to confirm that, or whether there should not be review at all.
513. Id.
514. U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Organisation, Sub-
Committee I (Article 94), Notes of the Fifth Meeting, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.95, at 2–3
(Feb. 10, 1948).
515. See U.N. Conf. on Trade and Employment, Sixth Comm., Rep. of Working Party of 
Sub-Committee G of Committee VI on Chapter VIII, GATT Doc. E/Conf.2/C.6/W.30 (Jan. 9, 
1948) [hereinafter Report of Sub-Committee G of Jan. 9, 1948].
516. Id. at 2.
517. Id.
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The findings of Sub-committee G aligned with those of Sub-committee 
I, especially the attention to the “effects” of Members’ actions, and recourse 
to the ITO legal design in the event of nullification or impairment of bene-
fits accruing to complaining Members. The final report of Sub-committee G 
did not offer further insights into the possibility of abuse of the exceptions.
With the Final Act of the UN Conference on Trade and Employment in 
March 1948, Article 99(1)(a) and (b) of the completed Havana Charter read, 
inter alia:
1. Nothing in this Charter shall be construed
(a) to require a Member to furnish any information the disclo-
sure of which it considers contrary to its essential security 
interests; or
(b) to prevent a Member from taking, either singly or with 
other States, any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests, where such 
action
(i) relates to fissionable materials or to the materials from 
which they are derived, or
(ii) relates to the traffic in arms, ammunition or imple-
ments of war, or to traffic in other goods and materials 
carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of sup-
plying a military establishment of the Member or of 
any country; or
(iii) is taken in time of war or other emergency in interna-
tional relations.518
VIII.  A Bifurcated Approach to the Interpretation 
of the Security Exceptions
Following completion of the Havana Charter, the U.S. delegation pre-
pared notes in anticipation of questions at U.S. Congressional hearings. The 
DOS archived files contained a collection of undated and unauthored mate-
rials to this effect.519 This final work on the ITO occurred after DOS staffing 
518. 1948 Havana Charter, supra note 64.
519. Clues as to timing are found in references to earlier Congressional hearings in 1947 
and to articles of the Havana draft. For example, with reference to article 99 (General Excep-
tions), the memorandum observed: “Article 99 is a considerable revision of the text before the 
Senate Committee in 1947.”). U.S. Dep’t of State, Comments on Questions Asked in Senate 
Finance Committee, Chapter IX, at 5 (on file with NACP, record group 43, box 18, A1 698, 
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changes, with key trade multilateralism advocates departing. William Clay-
ton had resigned as Undersecretary of State in October 1947. Clair Wilcox 
resigned in 1948 following the Havana Conference.520
The DOS prepared responses to questions on every provision of the 
ITO Charter, including questions regarding the scope of the security excep-
tions.521 The DOS confirmed that each ITO Member has “the right of self-
defence under International Law,” and that the security exceptions ensured 
that “nothing in the Charter shall interfere with the exercise of a member’s 
security interests.”522 However, the DOS was prepared to argue that there 
were “limits to the scope” of the exceptions, “since the action taken by a 
Member under Paragraph 1(b) must relate to fissionable materials, the sup-
ply of a military establishment or be taken in a time of war or other interna-
tional emergency.”523
In response to a follow-up question as to whether such actions would be 
reviewable by the ITO or the ICJ, the U.S. negotiators planned to answer:
The necessity for the action taken is not subject to review; the rela-
tionship of such action to the subjects referred to is subject to re-
view. Thus, in case a Member imposes export controls which the 
Member considers necessary for the protection of its essential secu-
rity interests on traffic in goods to supply the military establish-
ments of itself and certain other countries, it is necessary to decide 
where final authority lies to determine (1) the necessity for the pro-
tective measures and (2) the fact that the traffic is or is not to sup-
ply military establishments.524
On the “necessity” of the measure, the DOS was prepared to argue that 
the invoking member’s “judgment” was “final” and “not subject to review 
by the Organization or the Court.”525 Here, the DOS likely referred to the “it 
considers” language found in article 99(1)(a) and (b) of the Havana Charter. 
But, disputing Members could call upon the Organization to assess the “fac-
tual question” of whether the measure “relates to” the circumstances enu-
merated in the article’s subparagraphs.526 As “with any other decision of the 
file ‘Chapter IX’). The folder contains several versions of the same memorandum, with some 
containing handwritten edits, which are otherwise identical in the case of the portion related to 
article 99. There is one version of the memorandum from Kellogg to Burns, dated Feb. 15, 
1949, that reflects changes made by John Evans. 
520. Leddy Oral History, supra note 133, at ¶¶ 50, 72.
521. Comments on Questions Asked in Senate Finance Committee, supra note 519, at 
10.
522. Id. at 4.
523. Id.
524. Id. (emphasis added).
525. Id.
526. Id.
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Conference,” DOS understood article 96 of the Havana Charter to provide 
recourse to the ICJ.527
Notwithstanding the bifurcated test outlined above, the U.S. negotiators 
also prepared a response to a question about the United States’ obligation to 
supply certain information under the Havana Charter’s security exceptions. 
The DOS began by explaining that where a Member refused to establish the 
relationship between the security measure and the enumerated circumstanc-
es by supplying this information, then “subparagraph (b) [of article 94, re-
quiring factual assessment] must be construed to permit the Member con-
cerned to establish its case simply by testifying that the relationship in fact 
exists, without requiring substantiating evidence.”528 Although the com-
plainant Member could not argue that the invoking Member had violated the 
Charter, it could seek “appropriate and compensatory” relief, pursuant to the 
nullification or impairment procedure, in article 93 of the Havana Charter.529
There was no further elaboration as to how to connect this response to the 
separate question as to whether or not ITO bodies could make an objective 
determination as to whether a Member’s security measure constituted an 
enumerated circumstance within the security exception provision.
Nonetheless, this historiography suggests that one possible reading of 
this prepared answer is that the U.S. negotiators sought to explain that re-
gardless of the natural security rationale for certain actions, a procedure for 
relief was required to maintain the “mutuality of obligations and benefits” 
of all ITO Members.530
However, this procedure went beyond compensation. Wilcox explained 
in June 1947 that the nullification or impairment procedure was recognized 
as a “check” on the power of other Members to retaliate, and “to convert it 
from a weapon of economic warfare to an instrument of international or-
527. Id. at 4–5 (article 96 set out how the Organization could request from the ICJ an 
advisory opinion on legal questions).
528. Id. at 5. 
529. Id. (stating “injured Members might still be found entitled under clauses (b) and (c) 
of paragraph (1) of article 93, to compensatory relief in any appropriate case.”); 1948 Havana 
Charter, supra note 64, arts. 93–95. Article 93(1) provided: 
If any Member considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly, im-
plicitly or explicitly, under any of the provisions of this Charter other than Article 
1, is being nullified or impaired as a result of . . . (b) the application by a Member 
of a measure not conflicting with the provisions of this Charter, or (c) the existence 
of any other situation the Member may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment 
of the matter, make written representations or proposals to such other Member or 
Members as it considers to be concerned, and the Members receiving them shall 
give sympathetic consideration thereto.
530. U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council Comm’n, Preparatory Committee of the U.N. Conf. 
on Trade and Employment, Second Sess., Comm’n A, Verbatim Report of Its Sixth Meeting, 
GATT Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/6 (June 2, 1947) (Wilcox Statement) [hereinafter Sixth Delegation 
Meeting of Commission A, June 2, 1947].
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der.”531 The nullification or impairment procedure was seen by Wilcox as 
“fundamental” to the establishment of rules governing economic relations 
among states.532
IX.  The GATT: A New Context for the Security Exception
With the failure of the U.S. Congress to approve the ITO, the GATT, a 
provisional agreement for the reciprocal reduction of tariffs and other re-
strictions on trade, had to fill its absence.533 Eventually, the multilateral trade 
regime grew into the WTO and with it a more formal and legalized space 
than that which emerged from the GATT.534 That the GATT was not an or-
ganization, like the ITO would have been, meant a new context for the in-
terpretation of the security exceptions.535
Due to the timing of the GATT negotiation during the Geneva ITO pre-
paratory session, the text of article XXI was largely transplanted from the 
ITO’s New York and Geneva drafts.536 Still, when the GATT Secretariat an-
alyzed the final Havana Charter’s security exceptions (now in article 
99(1)(b)) and the security exceptions in article XXI(1)(b) of the GATT, it 
found the two nearly identical.537
Following Havana, there was discussion as to whether to review the 
GATT in light of the work completed in Havana on the ITO Charter, espe-
531. Id. at 4. Compare this against the statements of Dr. Holloway, the South African 
delegate, who had raised alarm in Geneva about the power of the ITO bodies to pass judgment 
on national policies and to authorize sanctions for “political” decision-making. Id. at 14.
532. Id. at 4.
533. The ITO was never ratified, largely due to the U.S. decision to abandon the effort in 
1950. See JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 12–17 (1990) (setting out 
how the GATT tariff bargain grew into the WTO); HUDEC, supra note 65, chs. 4–5.
534. HUDEC, supra note 65; Pauwelyn, supra note 433, at 14; J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of 
Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191 (2001).
535. See JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM, supra note 533, at 18 (ex-
plaining that the GATT was not the ITO or an organization, and thus the GATT lacked 
“Members”).
536. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 43 at 45; see also
Report of the Drafting Committee—New York Draft Charter and Draft GATT, supra note 274
at 65 (containing a draft GATT that confirmed that the “draft Agreement reproduces many 
provisions of the Charter,” specifically the commercial policy chapter). While the discussions 
leading to the conclusion of the GATT offer the most interpretive value, the Havana discus-
sions reveal further intentions of the delegations as to the separation of political and economic 
matters, as well as recourse to the nullification or impairment procedure. JACKSON, WORLD 
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 43 at 46-49.
537. GATT Secretariat Note, Aug. 18, 1987, supra note 258, ¶ 5. The GATT lacked ar-
ticle 86(3) regarding political actions and the jurisdiction of the UN, though article XXI(c) did 
observe: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party 
from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” GATT, art XXI(c), supra note 8.
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cially with regard to the ITO’s dispute resolution procedure.538 The First 
Session of the GATT Contracting Parties established a Sub-committee on 
Supersession to consider the incorporation of certain articles of the Havana 
Charter into the GATT.539 This GATT Sub-committee elected not to include 
certain parts of the ITO’s dispute resolution procedure that were present in 
the Havana Charter in the GATT on the basis that “the form in which these 
articles appear in the Charter is not suitable for the General Agreement.”540
This is not too surprising, as the original plan was for the GATT to exist 
within the institutional setting of the ITO.541
In another example, in the Second Session for the GATT Contracting 
Parties, there was consideration as to whether to bring in the “general prin-
ciples” of Chapters VII and VIII of the Havana Charter (which outlined the 
structure of the ITO and its dispute settlement procedure). Mr. Adarkar of 
the Indian delegation expressed his interest in referencing elements of the 
disputes procedure, quoting article 86(4) as an example.542 This provision, 
Leddy argued, was already in article XXI(c) of the GATT.543 Leddy further
cautioned that certain governments “disliked” the idea of treating the Con-
tracting Parties as “an organization” and that “it would be wise to omit re-
ferring to the chapters of the Charter dealing with procedural matters.”544
The Indian delegation later agreed to exclude reference to the chapters deal-
ing with the organization, functions, and procedures of the ITO on the basis 
538. See generally, HUDEC, supra note 65, at 56–62; JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE 
GATT SYSTEM, supra note 533, at 9–18. 
539. The Sub-committee on Supersession reported to the GATT Contracting Parties on 
March 11, 1948 with a draft protocol for modifying certain provisions. See GATT Sub-
committee on Supersession, Report to the Contracting Parties, GATT Doc. GATT/1/21 (Mar. 
11, 1948) [hereinafter Sub-committee on Supersession, Report to the Contracting Parties]. 
540. Id. at 3.
541. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 113 (1997). See HUDEC, supra 
note 65 at 53–58 (explaining how the GATT negotiations thereafter reviewed the language of 
the GATT, making corrections if desired). In the “final analysis, the substantive differences 
between GATT and the final ITO Charter were not very great.” Id. at 57.
542. GATT Contracting Parties, Second Sess., Summary Record of the Seventeenth 
Meeting, at 6, GATT Doc. GATT/CP.2/SR.17 (Sept. 2, 1948) [hereinafter Summary Record 
of the 17th Meeting]. Article 86(4) of the Havana Charter reads: “No action, taken by a Mem-
ber in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance or 
restoration of international peace and security, shall be deemed to conflict with the provisions 
of this Charter.” 1948 Havana Charter¸ supra note 64.
543. Id.
544. Id. Hudec analyzed the review of the GATT in light of the Havana Charter, and 
concluded that, as “the leading countries saw it, the original GATT was not intended to be a 
comprehensive world organization.” HUDEC, supra note 65, at 57. See also SUSAN 
AARONSON, TRADE AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR TRADE 
POLICY 130-132 (1996) (explaining how U.S. officials abandoned the ITO to preserve suc-
cessful GATT negotiations); BROWN, supra note 425; IRWIN ET AL., supra note 65; JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 541, at 113; Miller, supra note 3.
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“the contracting parties must regard themselves morally bound not to go 
back on the principles evolved at Havana.”545
X.  Application to Russia—Traffic in Transit
Decades later, analyzing a dispute under GATT XXI(1)(b)(iii), the Rus-
sia—Traffic in Transit panel echoed the DOS’s proposed bifurcated analysis 
of Havana Charter article 99, but it also imposed a good faith requirement 
on WTO Members invoking the security exception provision. Like the 
DOS, the WTO panel divided the legal analysis of article XXI(b) into dif-
ferent elements.546 First, the invoking member must demonstrate objectively 
that its measure falls under one of the circumstances enumerated in article 
XXI(b). The panel found that whether a measure qualifies as one of the 
enumerated actions in the subparagraphs of Article XXI(b) GATT, such as 
“supplying a military establishment” or “emergency in international rela-
tions,” was an “objective fact,” amenable to “objective determination” by a 
WTO panel.547
The WTO panel then considered the chapeau of article XXI GATT. 
Under the chapeau, an invoking member must “sufficiently”548 articulate the 
“essential security interests” it seeks to protect.549 The panel understood the 
term “essential security interests” in the sense of the “quintessential func-
tions of the state, namely, the protection of its territory and its population 
from external threats, and the maintenance of law and public order internal-
ly.”550 In addition, the invoking member must meet “a minimum require-
ment of plausibility” that the measures taken were protective of its essential 
security interests.551
The WTO panel limited Member discretion in this area through the “ob-
ligation of good faith,” which is “a general principle of law and a principle 
of general international law” as codified in articles 26 and 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.552 The obligation of good faith requires 
Members not “re-label[] trade interests” as “essential security interests,” 
545. GATT Contracting Parties, Second Sess., Summary Record of the Eighteenth Meet-
ing, at 2, GATT Doc. GATT/CP.2/SR.18 (Sept. 3, 1948).
546. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
547. Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, supra note 4, ¶¶ 7.64, 7.77.
548. What qualified as “sufficient” depended on a WTO panel’s determination of how 
“characteristic” the member’s essential security interests are to the circumstances described in 
the subparagraphs of article XXI(b). In the Russia—Traffic in Transit dispute, this meant the 
panel evaluated how “characteristic” the “emergency in international relations” was; i.e., how 
“obvious are the defence or military interests, or maintenance of law and public order inter-
ests, that can be generally expected to arise.” Id. ¶ 7.135.
549. Id. ¶ 7.134.
550. Id. ¶ 7.130.
551. Id. ¶ 7.138.
552. Id. ¶ 7.132.
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thereby circumventing the rules and norms established by the multilateral 
trade system.553
As to the “subjective” evaluation of article XXI GATT, the panel de-
termined that the adjectival clause “which it considers” meant that “it is for 
Russia to determine the ‘necessity’ of the measures for the protection of its 
essential security interests.”554
It remains to be seen how the current national security controversies 
will be resolved at the WTO. Despite the vital nature of security concerns, 
several scholars concluded that the WTO panel’s analysis reinforced (and 
championed) WTO adjudication as a necessary element in establishing in-
ternational stability in the multilateral trade system.555 Trade scholar Nicolas 
Lamp has offered a convincing argument that where Members have invoked 
article XXI GATT, they may “sidestep” the debates about the self-judging 
and non-justiciable nature of article XXI by seeking non-violation nullifica-
tion or impairment claims.556 Lamp’s recommendation would allow WTO 
Members to address trade-security disputes while avoiding escalation, and 
returns the focus to “the level of benefits which have been nullified or im-
paired.”557 In this way, Lamp seeks to maintain the functions of trade multi-
lateralism for all WTO Members, which U.S. negotiators once believed was 
a necessary element for the success of each participating country and the 
global economy overall.
XI.  Concluding Thoughts
The goal of this article is to shed light on contemporary questions and 
concerns involving national security and international trade, particularly 
questions involving the appropriate invocation of article XXI GATT, 
through careful attention to the article’s historical context. The article began 
by elucidating the diverse strategic and economic considerations that shaped 
553. Id. ¶ 7.133 (drawing attention to the commitments under the GATT and the WTO 
Agreement).
554. Id. ¶ 7.146.
555. See generally Geraldo Vidigal, WTO Adjudication and the Security Exception: 
Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed—Something Blue? 46 LEGAL ISSUES 
ECON. INTEGRATION 203 (2019) (offering an in-depth assessment of the panel report); Benton 
Heath, Trade, Security, and Stewardship (Part I): The Russia—Transit Report’s Vision of 
WTO Dispute Settlement, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (May 5, 2019, 6:59 PM), 
https://ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2019/05/guest-post-trade-security-and-stewardship-part-i-the-
russia-transit-reports-vision-of-wto-dispute-se.html.  
556. Nicolas Lamp, Why WTO Members Should Bring Pure Non-Violation Claims 
Against National Security Measures, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018, 10:24 
AM), https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/10/guest-post-why-wto-members-
should-bring-pure-non-violation-claims-against-national-security-measures.html; Understand-
ing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 of the WTO 
Agreement, 1869 U.N.T.S. 40, art. 26 (1994).
557. Lamp, supra note 556.
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the meaning of U.S. national security interests at the time when national 
delegations were drafting the post-war multilateral trade system, the ITO. It 
provided the internal deliberations of U.S. officials who served as key archi-
tects of the multilateral trade system and of the ITO Charter’s security ex-
ceptions. The article then demonstrated how U.S. interests, in turn, created 
the language, phrasing, and placement of the security exceptions within the 
ITO Charter, and it details when and to what extent this language was 
adopted in the GATT. Throughout this process, the article offered an in-
formative look at how U.S. negotiators balanced inclusion of security ex-
ceptions, a necessary political reality, with the goals and functions of trade 
multilateralism.558
The insights introduced by this article help illuminate, but also compli-
cate, current debates about the interpretation of article XXI GATT. First, the 
article reveals that U.S. negotiators sought to balance competing U.S. con-
cerns, particularly the demands of U.S. national security and defense, with 
the benefits of developing the U.S. and international economies through 
trade multilateralism. The Services Departments desired that the proposed 
ITO Charter contain broad security exceptions to protect the United States 
and advance its interests, without any other Member’s approval. Services 
appeared little concerned with how other ITO Members could apply such 
exceptions. By contrast, the DOS opposed broad exceptions for security that 
would apply at a Member’s unilateral determination.
Why would the most powerful negotiating state at the time not seek a 
self-judging, non-justiciable exception article? The Department of State’s 
negotiators often repeated the same argument—which formed a pattern that 
shaped the security exceptions: National security could not exist in opposi-
tion to the ITO; it would have to co-exist within it because freer trade was 
better for the world, and the United States, in the long-term.
The Cold War and building tensions between the United States and the 
Soviet Union framed a multiplicity of U.S. national security concerns, 
which impacted the formulation of the security exceptions. While the Soviet 
Union never participated in the drafting of the ITO Charter, U.S. negotiators 
sought to develop the ITO as an institution for trade liberalization and non-
discriminatory trade, which could be used to build an interdependent global 
economy. In this light, officials from the U.S. State Department wanted the 
ITO to bind Members together, making the success of the ITO an economic 
and strategic goal. DOS officials believed it was better to tear down walls 
by opening trade than to use the concept of national security to build them 
up. Even beyond the DOS’s concerns of abuse of broadly written security 
exceptions, archived materials reveal that U.S. negotiators refused to allow 
a broadly scoped provision to unravel other hard-fought compromises made 
with other governments.
558. See 1 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 479–
480 (2016). 
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To achieve balance between competing U.S. agencies, the U.S. negotia-
tors had to compromise. U.S. proposals paired open-ended phrases and self-
judging language with enumerated circumstances that limited the types of 
actions that qualified under the exceptions. Open-ended terms and phrases 
could, when reported to officials in Washington, seem to comply with the 
demands for total U.S. discretion over security policies in the future. The 
language allowed ITO members to determine for themselves what was 
“necessary for the protection of its essential security interests.” But to con-
strain abuse, the negotiators also drafted in factual questions about the ac-
tions taken by invoking Members, such as whether they were “relating to 
fissionable materials;” “relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and im-
plements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials;” or “taken 
in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” Over seventy 
years later, a WTO panel adopted this same approach in the first formal dis-
pute over  invocation of article XXI GATT.
This article also provides insights into how the national security excep-
tions would have operated within the ITO’s legal design. If the United 
States (or another ITO Member) had a bona fide national security problem, 
the DOS believed that the ITO membership would not challenge measures 
taken in response.559 Yet where such a security measure nullified or im-
paired the benefits accruing to a Member under the Charter, the ITO offered 
a forum for Members to restore the “mutuality of obligations and bene-
fits.”560 This “non-violation complaint” procedure emphasized redress rather 
than an evaluation of the merits of security actions.561 It aimed to restore the 
“careful balance of the interests of the contracting States.”562
But, crucially, advocating access to non-violation complaints did not re-
solve a larger question as to how the ITO would regulate or address poten-
tial abuses of the security exceptions. As the internal U.S. materials suggest, 
the DOS attempted to answer this question by making the exceptions sub-
ject to the ITO’s dispute settlement mechanism and by bifurcating the inter-
pretive steps required to invoke a security exception. Though some aspects 
of the exceptions’ invocation were considered subjective, Members could 
only invoke an exception if they could demonstrate that their security ac-
tions were among those enumerated as permissible.
Ultimately, this article also informs our understanding of the evolution 
of the world trade system. Over the past seventy years, the language of the 
security exceptions has remained unchanged, whereas the approach to re-
solving trade disputes between governments has not.563 Despite an evolu-
559. See supra text accompanying notes 347–353.
560. Sixth Meeting of Commission A, June 2, 1947, supra note 530, at 5.
561. See Verbatim Report of the Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, supra note 
420, at 27. 
562. Sixth Meeting of Commission A, June 2, 1947, supra note 530, at 5.
563. While Article XXI GATT has not been amended, the contracting parties adopted a 
Decision Concerning Article XXI of the GATT in 1982, setting forth procedural guidelines 
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tion from the GATT to the WTO, the original rationale for the ITO’s nullifi-
cation or impairment procedure continues to exist within WTO dispute set-
tlement, and the procedure is found within article XXIII of the GATT. This 
ITO procedure offered a legal basis for Members to claim damages without 
having to point to specific illegality by another Member under the Charter 
rules. Clair Wilcox, the lead U.S. negotiator for the U.S. delegation, ex-
plained the value the United States placed on this procedure, then article 
35(2) of the Geneva Charter draft: “We have introduced a new principle into 
international economic relations. We have asked the nations of the world to 
confer upon an international organization the right to limit their power to 
retaliate.”564 And, in light of the nascent dispute settlement mechanism, 
Members recognized that peaceful resolution of disputes depended on in-
formal techniques and norms– described as the ITO’s “atmosphere” or 
“spirit.”
The article provides not only context for evaluation of WTO Members’ 
interpretations of article XXI GATT but also a fascinating story as to how 
different U.S. agencies competed to define U.S. national security policy. 
The State Department advocated that trade multilateralism was a necessary 
ingredient for national security. If that has changed over the course of time, 
then our next question must be: Why?
for the application of article XXI. See GATT, Decision Concerning Article XXI of the Gen-
eral Agreement, GATT Doc. L/5426 (Dec. 2, 1982) (setting out, inter alia, a requirement that 
contracting parties should “be informed to the fullest extent possible of trade measures taken 
under Article XXI”). For information on the transformation from GATT to WTO, see supra 
note 550 and accompanying text.
564. Sixth Meeting of Commission A, June 2, 1947, supra note 530, at 4.

